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ARTICLES
INTELLECT BEYOND LAW: THE CASE OF LEGAL
EDUCATION
PETER

W. GROSS*

Synopsis. Conceptions of intellect long basic to Western academic
thought increasingly are being called into question. These conceptions,
which equate intellect with finding and applying the "laws" that govern
phenomena, have been seen to divorce us from realities of choice and selfcreation that underlie the human experience. The first half of the Article
develops these themes, suggesting the philosophical and practical importance of alternative, more expansive conceptions of intellect. The second
half then illustrates these points, using legal education as a case study.
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ing it ....
[That is] the reason why judges should not be particularly bright, or they would change the law consciously too
frequently.1
The new universe of discourse and sensibility that is emerging requires that we become increasingly aware that human beings are
self-interpreting creatures, and that those interpretations are constitutive of what we are as human beings.2
The ethical problem with which we are concerned is the problem
of the sense in which every mature mind is the architect of its
own world.3
I.

INTRODUCTION

The nomological4 model of knowledge and rationality thoroughly dominates Western academic thought. The reason the word "nomological" is
relatively unfamiliar, indeed, is that the concept to which it refers is so
taken for granted that we have little occasion to speak of it. The conception is manifested in today's common sense assumption that knowledge
consists of discovering and applying laws that underlie reality. Thus, with
respect to products of inquiry in a given field, we measure success by the
extent to which our knowledge of the laws that govern phenomena in that
field has become accurate, complete, and systematically expressed. With
respect to processes of inquiry in a given field, we measure success by the
extent to which we are able to bring to bear on phenomena in that field
the laws of logic (thereby achieving rationality with respect to manipulation of concepts in the field) and of accurate perception (thereby achieving rationality with respect to acquisition of data in the field).
From the nomological perspective, "non-nomological" signifies only imperfection; it is the failure of a body of knowledge, theory, argument, or
the like, to be what it is supposed to be. This Article argues, however,
that our conceptions of intellect have neglected non-nomological modes of
understanding and that we have much to gain by remedying this neglect.
"Nomological" and "non-nomological" signify model-and-metaphor

Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent, and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV. 587, 608
(1938)(emphasis added). See infra note 50.
2 R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 113 (1976).
'

C.

WEGENER, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 119 (1978).

' "Nomological" is used herein to mean the conception that phenomena are determined
by law. Nomological knowledge is knowledge in the form of propositional systems that: 1)
have a complete set of identified premises; 2) use terms susceptible of precise definition;
and 3) rely on accepted modes of logical or empirical proof. In the real world, most of our
processes and products of intellect (i.e., explanations, arguments, and theories) are imperfectly nomological. However, it is appropriate to call them "nomological" when referring to
them in their aspect as aspiring to, or approaching, the nomological paradigm.
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systems' for understanding intellect. The emphases embodied in those
two systems can be glossed as follows:
Nomological

Non-Nomological

Mechanical
History-Conquering
Closed
Exteriorly Ordered

Organic
History-Immersed
Open
Interiorly Ordered
A.

Nomological

1. Mechanical
The highest achievement of intellect would be to replicate intellect
outside ourselves. Nomological intellect, for which the most worthwhile
statements consist of terms that are operationalized, quantified, and/or
all-or-none, can best be understood in terms of artificially-reproducible
functions. The traditional model is a logic based on dualities of movedmover, true-false, and present-absent.
2. History-Conquering
With respect to the enterprise of pure knowing, our goal is to transcend
the limited perspectives of our historical situation and to construct permanent universal nomological structures that are good for all times and
places. With respect to the enterprise of knowing for a purpose, our goal
is technology that enables us to control ourselves and as much of the universe as we can reach.
3.

Closed

The paradigm of knowledge is systematic propositional structures
which, like mathematical systems, rest on a complete set of self-consistent axioms whose terms have fixed and certain meanings. Our goal is to
develop knowledge systems sufficiently complete and accurate that all
phenomena encompassed by the system can be predicted and controlled
by it.

4.

Exteriorly Ordered

Reality and rationality are governed by laws; our object is to learn and
apply those laws. Data of perception are given, and we process them in
accordance with the rules of rationality. Our chief intellectual purpose is
to construct a perfect mirror of the objects and events that comprise

' See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
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reality.
B.

Non-Nomological

1.

Organic

Models and metaphors derived from our experience of the organic e.g., "plasticity," "purposiveness," "coalescence," "flux," and "gestalt" are useful in understanding intellect, especially in understanding our
"subjective experience" of intellect.
2.

History-Immersed

Intellectual life consists of moving from one situation to the next.
Throughout, our perspectives always are temporally bound. At each moment, we attend to aspects of phenomena according to the program of the
project that is the vehicle of our movement. Being immersed in our unfolding history, we are both creator and created: we are in a relationship
of coevolution with the situations through which we move.
3.

Open

Fundamental change and growth in understanding are essential, permanent conditions of intellectual life. The resource used in inquiry living knowledge - consists largely of concepts in flux. Ambiguity is an
essential feature of living concept systems. Paradox, antinomy, and complementarity may be as true and as useful as logical systematicity.
4.

Interiorly Ordered

The choices and projects of an intending "intellective I" comprise the
seat of rationality. Our conceptualizations, especially of ourselves and of
our works and institutions, are both discovery and creation: we are selfcreating beings.
C.

Beyond the Nomological Tradition- Intellect, Sell, and Being in
the World

The nomological and the non-nomological are complementary. Each is
ground for, and can be adequately understood only in relation to, the
other. The conception of intellect underlying this Article, then, does not
reject the nomological, but rejects the domination by it that will be called
here "the nomological tradition."
The central point is this: with Plato, Western thought crossed a Rubicon away from self, away from "subjectivity" and "human choice," toward the objective and the nomological in our conceptions and projects of
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intellect.' Descartes and Kant consolidated that movement.' But we have
found that the ethos of objectivization dominates our thought in ways
that impede understanding of human selves and human institutions.' On
I In establishing his vision of a stable world knowable to reason, Plato overthrew sophistic, which sought "to rationalize the process by which opinion is formed and then effectively expressed," and the ethos of poetic, which entailed open participation in a narrative.
Against those traditions, he established the primacy of static concepts, knowable to reason,
that comprise essential reality. See E. HAVELOCK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS
156, 193, 215-30, 241 (1957); E. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO 47, 235-48 (1963).
For Plato, an "idea" was a perfectly knowable essence perceived by the eye of the
soul. Reflecting the scientific temper of his time, Descartes (1596-1650) naturalized "idea"
by using it to refer to all the content of consciousness. He sought to identify and build a
methodology of rationality upon those ideas which are "clear and distinct" and therefore
indubitable.
Where Descartes stressed logical and mathematical inquiry, John Locke (1632-1704)
stressed the empirical. Also seeking sources of indubitabilty, Locke held that in sense experience objects imprint themselves on the tablet of the mind. However, this left unsatisfactorily answered what thing this "tablet" is, and how sense impressions can give rise to complex ideas.
At the time of Kant (1724-1804), there was no adequate unified account of knowledge.
Kant's solution was to posit that we possess concepts reflecting universal and necessary laws
underlying both empirical knowledge, and logical and mathematical reasoning. Those concepts, arranged in broad categories ("space," "time," etc.), express the formal character of
phenomena in the world. We "know" the world through those concepts, because the same
logically structured, universal laws underlie them and the world. See R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 6-9, 38-69, 132-64 (1979); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM: ESSAYS 1972-1980 164-66 (1982). See also infra notes 29 and 32.
1 People whose thought has seemed especially illuminating in this regard include: W.
BARRETT, THE ILLUSION OF TECHNIQUE (1978); R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY (1976); N. BOLTON, CONCEPT FORMATION (1977); F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT (1982); J. DEWEY, How WE THINK (1910); J_ DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge ed. 1976); K.J. GERGEN,
TOWARD TRANSFORMATION IN SOCIAL KNOwLEDGE(1982)(hereinafter "TRANSFORMATON"); S_
HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION (1959); E. HAVELOCK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK
POLITICS (1957); E. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO (1963); M. HEIDEGGER, DISCOURSE ON
THINKING (1966); G. STEINER, MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1978); G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, META-

BY (1981); R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974);
R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979)(hereinafter MIRROR); R. RORTY
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM; ESSAYS 1972-1980 (1982)(hereinafter CONSEQUENCES); S.
PHORS WE LIVE

TOULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING THE COLLECTIVE USE AND EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS 1972

(hereinafter HUMAN UNDERSTANDING); S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); C. WEGENER, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE MODERN
UNIVERSITY

(1978); L.

WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

(1953).

The root problem, it will be seen, is that the nomological tradition treats language and
thought as phenomena that are "out there," as phenomena we are observing and whose laws
we are seeking to discover. "Out there" is a metaphor attempting to render the "objectivization" half of an objective-subjective duality that, it will be seen, is central to the nomological tradition. While this spatial metaphor is used throughout the Article (as, for example, in
"exteriorily ordered" and "interiorily ordered" in description of the nomological and nonnomological), one must recognize its limitations. Thus, anything can be objectivized, including "internal," subjective phenomena, which are precisely what the science of psychology
does seek to objectivize.
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a broad front, therefore, Western thought is seeking to recross the RubiconY The difference is that our aim now is not to occupy one versus the
other bank, but it is to encompass the whole.
This Article empasizes" aspects of intellect that pertain to:
(a) change and adaptation in our thought;
(b) the temporal-experiential dimension of intellect-especially, the
senses in which thought is action; and
(c) dimensions of freedom and self-creation in intellect.
The relationship between the nomological and non-nomological
presented in this Article is comprehensible only when intellect is understood temporally-that is, in terms of the open, continually unfolding
character of human thought. Thus, the themes of "post-nomological"
thought presented in this Article must be understood as part of a historically-located project aimed at emancipation from the nomological tradition. Underlying this Article's perspective on what it means to discuss
intellect, moreover, is the point that thinking about intellect is a reflexive
process" in which our conceptions become part of the data out of which

The point is that what matters is not what one looks at but how one conceives, and so
creates, one's relation to it. The post-nomological perspective gives epistemological status to
the interactive, open character of our relation to language and thought. See, e.g., MIRROR,
supra, at 359 (observing with approval that Gadamer substituted "the notion of Bildung
(education, self-formation) for that of 'knowledge' as the goal of thinking").
' The people named in the preceding footnote are interested in reconstruction no less
than in critique.
o From the nomological perspective, what counts in a thought system is that which the
system holds true. The formulation in the text above this footnote is non-nomological in
reflecting the view that a thought system is defined less by the propositions it holds true
than by those it chooses to emphasize. Cf. R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1976)("The most important and interesting challenges to any dominant
orientation are those which force us to question the implicit and explicit emphases, that
make us self-conscious not only of what is included in the foreground, but excluded or relegated to the background as unimportant, illegitimate, or impractical." Id. at 41.)
This need to choose, which is a concomitant of the temporality of human existence, gives
rise to a basic issue of "epistemological status," of what is important to attend to as knowing. See J. KAPUT, Mathematics and Learning: Roots of Epistemological Status, in COGNITIVE PROCESS INSTRUCTION 289-303 (J. Lochhead & J. Clement eds. 1979)(elaborating the
issue of "epistemological status" in the course of contending for the importance, qua knowledge, of presently neglected processes of learning and inquiry in mathematics). See supra
note 8 (final paragraph).
" This reflexivity is manifested in science and philosophy in the following way. In science, intellect exists in a "ladder" of enterprises: (a) First rung. Phenomena in nature comprise the primary subject of science. Science is intellect looking at those phenomena. (b)
Second rung. The philosophy of science is intellect looking at the first rung enterprise. Using parentheses to signify grouping as one does in mathematical notation, the second rung
enterprise is: intellect looking at (intellect looking at natural phenomena). (c) Third rung.
When we talk about the philosophy of science-for example, when we note different explanatory concepts used in the philosophy of science-we have intellect looking at the second
rung enterprise. The third rung enterprise, then, is: intellect looking at (intellect looking at
(intellect looking at natural phenomena)). (d) Fourth rung, etc. The two preceding
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new conceptions are formed. In thinking about intellect we create
ourselves.
In the academy today, intellect is a phenomenon, like any other, to be
studied. Viewing intellect as an object of study, we make it datum-a
given. The epistemology of intellect pursued in this Article, however,
views thought about intellect as both discovery and creation. The subject
of this inquiry is what-we-are-and -what-we-can-become as intellect. The
more aware we are of this, the more intellectively competent we can become, and the more choiceful-and therefore free-can be our intellectual
lives. The epistemology of intellect becomes, then, a quest for self-understanding, competence and freedom.
This Article's assertions about intellect are, in a sense, tautological. It
points to certain human behavior, calls that intellect, and then says, "See,
this is what 'intellect' is." But traditional nomological conceptions of intellect are no less tautological. For, the situation is that we lack neutral
criteria for deciding what counts as a process or product of intellect, because intellection itself is what we mean by "neutral."
How, then, do we decide what counts as intellect? The Article addresses that question not in terms of an abstract "we" or the universalized positions common in philosophical discourse, but in terms of "I's" at

sentences are intellect looking at the third rung enterprise, and so on.
What is happening is that each enterprise "level," examining or revising work done in the
level "below," separates that work's conceptualizations from the subject of those conceptualizations, and considers (a) what the conceptualizations are, (b) how they came about, and/or
(c) what else they might have been. Discourse in the philosophy of science typically combines the second rung and the third.
The corresponding ladder in philosophy, viewing philosophy in terms of its primary modern subject, epistemology, is as follows: (a) First rung. The underlying phenomenon is intellection - people perceiving, knowing, reasoning, etc. (b) Second rung. Philosophy is intellect looking at the first rung enterprise, it is intellect looking at intellect. It addresses
questions such as, "How do we know?," "What is knowledge?," and the like. (c) Third rung.
When we examine or critique theories of knowledge and the like generated in the second
rung enterprise, we have: intellect looking at (intellect looking at intellect). (d) Fourth rung,
etc. The preceding sentence is intellect looking at the third rung enterprise, and so on.
Much of the discussion in this Article is at the third rung level. This generally is so, for
example, in its use of the terms "nomological" and "non-nomological." As is true of most
discourse, however, the Article generally mixes levels.
With respect to enterprise rungs five, six, seven, and so on, there seems little to be gained
by conceptualizing thought about thought in terms of such an infinitely extendible set of
enterprise-levels. What does seem useful, is to keep in mind that we always can move to a
"next level" to examine and revise thinking we have done, and that we regularly do so in
thought.
The following question, now, may be asked: Do the preceding paragraphs purport to
stand outside the reflexive flux they describe? The answer is "no," and this entails the
paradox that all statements, including the present one, are subject to examination and revision. This, which is an "infinite regress" from a linear-logical perspective, is simply "reflexive" from the temporal perspective that is characteristic of the non-nomological. See also
supra note 8.
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work in the academic setting. In particular, the focus will be on projects
and conceptions that shape our understanding of "intellect," "self," and
"being in the world." The Article posits that it is our role as teachers that
most directly challenges academics to examine and integrate those three
dimensions of our thought. For, it is as teachers, preparing other selves
for being in the world, that we most tangibly act out our conceptions of
the relationship between intellectual ideals of the academy and being in
the world.
The first four sections of the Article suggest how the nomological tradition has impeded recognition of the open and choiceful character of intellect. Section II develops this in relation to science and law, which are,
respectively, paradigms of descriptive and prescriptive nomological structure. Sections III and IV show how the nomological tradition has undermined what may be termed the "ideology" of intellect in the academy,
focusing on the ideals of truth (Section III) and liberal education (Section
IV).
The second half of the Article begins by reviewing contemporary critique and reform in legal education, suggesting how these efforts have
been hampered by the nomological tradition. Section VI then suggests an
avenue of critique and reform, centered on the "skill of learning," that
follows from themes of the post-nomological presented in Sections I-IV.
The Article concludes by considering how we can work to increase coherence in the educational enterprise, offering a conception of theoretic dialogue that, too, builds on themes earlier presented.
II.
A.

PROJECTS OF INTELLECT

The Project-OrientedCharacter of Knowing

2
From the nomological perspective, valid reasoning must apodictically
establish the truth of one's conclusions, because, otherwise, there would
stand between data and logic on the one hand, and conclusion on the
other, a "decision to accept as so." This, in turn, would inject an inexplicable choice into the basic workings of rational deliberation. While such
choice is inexplicable from the nomological perspective, it is fully understandable from the following non-nomological perspective.
The nomological tradition conceives knowledge as systematic bodies of
true propositions. However, when we look at knowledge as it exists in the
world, we see that it exists not in bodies of propositions, but in what we

" "Apodictic" means that which "can clearly be shown or proved." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 64 (2d Col. ed. 1972). Just as knowledge is taken to be flawed insofar as

not nomological, and rationality in the empirical realm is supposed to consist in being compelled by data, see infra note 15, so proof is taken to be flawed insofar as not apodictic, and
rationality in the logical realm is supposed to consist in being constrained by rule. CONsEQUENCES, supra note 8, at 164.
0
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can call "project matrices." "Project matrix" means products of intellect
corresponding to actual projects, such as writing a book, writing a judicial
opinion, developing a theory, explaining an experimental result, or analyzing a body of principles.
When knowledge is viewed from this perspective, an overriding realization is that, with respect to any proposition accepted in one project, in a
subsequent project one may 1) decide more evidence is needed before one
is willing to accept the proposition; 2) elaborate or qualify the proposition; or 3) abandon the proposition in favor of one drawn from another
aspect or system of description.
In this sense, it is fundamental that there is a "decision" between data
and logic on the one hand, and conclusion on the other, and that the
rationality guiding that decision is provided by the goals and substantive
purview of the project in which the decision is made. Thus, while acknowledging the importance of what we posit as extrinsic nomological
structures in the conception and direction of our projects, we also need to
see the plastic and creative character of knowing.
Underlying the project-oriented character of knowledge is the purposive character of cognition. The nomological faith is that in cognition we
ingest, as it were, bits of reality. But this vastly understates the extent to
which what we experience is of necessity our purposive interpretations of
reality. Thus, cognition grasps not whole things but aspects of things. A
given whole thing can be addressed as a chair, a body with such and such
a mass, or a piece of modern art. The aspects of the world we choose to
perceive, and the concepts in which we choose to conceive them, are a
function of our purposes. 3 An intending (that is, a purposeful and
choiceful) "I" is the seat of all action-not merely of motor movements,
with which the word "act" generally is identified, but of mental processes
as well.
We need a reformulated conceptual vocabulary with which to understand the integrality of "intention," "cognition," and "action." While, for
many actions, intending and acting are separable events, in cognition we
generally realize our intention in the action itself. The word "realize,"
here, means both "to discover" and "to create." These two meanings
render, respectively, the (a) perceiving and (b) conceiving by which intellective "I" projects itself into being. The verb "project" has a double
meaning as well. It means (a) to cast from "in here" to "out there" and
(b) to cast from now into the future. Those two meanings, render, respec-

" See generally N. BOLTON, CONCEPT FORMATION (1977); S, HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND
ACTION (1959).
Perception and conception are "correlative processes, two aspects of a single whole"; "our
concepts develop as we organize the environment . . . and we organize the environment
through our concepts." CONCEPT FORMATION at 20. Accordingly, in cognition, human beings
are simultaneously "observers... agents. . . and language users." THOUGHT AND ACTION at
67.
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tively, the (a) interactive (mind-interacting-with-world) and (b) temporal
(present-into-future), dimensions of intentionality in cognition.
How, then, are we constrained by any rational order of reality and conception? The key to rationality is that the projects of individuals do not
occur in isolation. Not only do we operate within a culture of language
and thought, each project of intellect is an event-of-dialogue within a particular sub-community of that culture. The tradition of analytic empiricism defines one such sub-community, for example, while the literary tradition defines another, very different one.
The point of present relevance, in sum, is that knowing occurs as a
function of projects of intellect, performed by individuals within a partic14
ular community of language, thought and aspiration.
B.

Science

Apart from mathematics, science, especially natural science, is as close
as human institutions come to realizing the nomological ideal. Natural
science today sets the standard of inquiry and of knowing to which the
academy aspires. Therefore, it is especially important to recognize the extent to which the nomological tradition has impeded our understanding
of the open, choiceful, and creative character of the projects of science.
1.

Choicefulness in Scientific Inquiry

The conventional paradigm of science holds that fields of science are
defined extrinsically-that is, by the things or events that comprise the
subject matter of the field. In this view, by finding and following the rules
of knowing, one succeeds in holding a mirror up to those phenomena, reproducing them in one's explanations." However, this view vastly understates the open, choiceful character of science.
At the core of each field of science is a set of "explanatory ambitions"' 6
which are defined in terms of the "explanatory task[s]' 1 7 that the field
has set for itself. These definitions can be understood partly in terms of
the phenomena chosen to be explained and partly in terms of the forms
chosen for the explanation. For example, atomic physics at the turn of
the century set out to find "ways of accounting for the relevant properties
of actual objects and substances in detail" in terms of sub-atomic struc-

" From this perspective one understands that "lilt is within the process of social interchange that rationality is generated," TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 207, and that a
grounding theory of rationality aptly can be termed "sociorationalism." Id. at 207-09.
" The belief is that data compel knowledge - that "the object which the proposition is
about imposes the propositional truth." MIRROR, supra note 8, at 157. See also infra note
30.
" HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING,

supra note 8, at 151.

" Id. at 236.
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tures.' 8 Similarly, micro-economics today pursues the ambition of explaining economic activity in terms of an "equilibrium price-auction"
model of purchase decisions." In these, as in all cases, scientists have a
"rich legacy of possible explanatory forms or patterns ' 20 on which to
draw. Choices among such patterns, made correlatively with definition of
the field's explanatory objectives, turn on judgments as to the anticipated
"intelligibility" and "fruitfulness" of such patterns in relation to the explanatory objectives.2 '
The nomological tradition embodies judgments about what comprises
legitimate, fruitful inquiry. For example, social science today routinely
adopts the premise that "individuals are exclusively motivated to maximize their private wants,"2 at least in part because that premise yields
the kind of quantified data and rigorously lawful explanations that correspond to the nomological ideal.
But it is in these nomological aspirations of social and psychological
science that the nomological tradition is especially problematic. The
problem is that when people seem to defy thus being controlled or understood, social science attributes the imperfections of its knowledge structures to the comparative youth of the science13-or to lack of rigor in its
methods, 2 ' not recognizing that the aspiration to create nomological
structures itself raises important issues. Thus, for example, a strong case
can be made that higher human functions are in fact not completely law
governed 21-or, at least, that nomological methods of study have been unproductive in,2" and seem poorly suited to,2" the understanding of such
functions.
The point of present relevance is less who is "right" and who is
"wrong" with respect to such issues, than that our premises are chosen,
and our choices influence what, as well as how, we know.

" Id. at 151-54.
" L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS XVIII (1983).

"

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,

2"

Id. at 255.

supra note 8, at 156.

" R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 229 (1976).
" See id. at 8, 32, 52 ("One could write the history of much of the social science during
the past hundred years in terms of declarations that it has just become, or is about to become, a geniune scientific enterprise.").
24 See id. at 43-44.
22 See TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 12-21, 60-68, 153-61 (asserting the open and
indeterminate character of human processes such as voluntary action, intentionality, reflexivity, and self-interpretation).
11 See TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 4 n.4 and accompanying text (citing studies
that emphasize the limited progress made by sociobehavioral science).
27 See TRANSFORMATION,

supra note 8, at 4-57 (comprehensive critique of the method-

ological premises of traditional sociobehavioral science, centered on the incompatibility of
(a) the deterministic premises of nomological science and (b) human realities of voluntary
action, intentionality, reflexivity, and self-interpretation). See also infra note 172 and ac-

companying text.
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2.

Organic Growth in Scientific Concepts

The conventional paradigm of science holds that the knowledge comprising each field is a logical structure of precise-term propositions, and
inquiry proceeds by testing, extending, and reasoning with those propositions. This pushes our conception of science toward the model of a completed science-that is, toward science in which all major problematics
have been resolved. This, in turn, serves to obscure the essential nature of
28
a living science, in which nomological structures are not fixed but fluid.
Thus, the corpus of knowledge in a field of living science perhaps is best
understood as comprised of pockets of nomological structure within a
fabric of organically-growing concepts.
3. Interpenetration of Concepts and Data
Our tacit model of mind is that it is a place in which one reasons with
concepts about data."0 In science, the dichotomy between concepts and
data presupposed by such a model assumes the following form: it is supposed that in scientific inquiry, one either treats one's concepts as
"given," and uses them to analyze or incorporate new data, or treats the
data as "given," and tests the adequacy and accuracy of one's concepts
against them. In the former case, the concepts comprise a nomological
structure of fixed terms into which the data are to fit; in the latter, the
fixed terms of nomological structure are amended to conform to objectively given data.
This model fails to reflect the extent to which concepts and data commonly "interpenetrate," in the sense that the inquirer simultaneously
forms concepts and uses them to select, perceive and explain the data.
Thus, in scientific inquiry, it is paradigmatic that problems are solved
"by working on both the empirical and the formal levels at once."" Scientific inquiry, then, can be understood as the effort to construct fruitful
relationships between concept and data.32
supra note 8, at 189-91.
"' Id. at 128. The nomological tradition understands the history of science as a "chroni-

28 HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,

cle of successive propositional systems." Id. at 478. This is no less true of "historicist-relativist" (e.g., Collingwood and Kuhn) than of "absolutist" (e.g., Frege) philosophers of science. Id. at 54-59, 80-85, 126-27. At deepest levels, this nomological understanding rests on
the Kantian conception that knowledge is propositions. See MIRROR supra note 8, at 154,
161. Understanding knowledge as an organically growing concept (see text above this note)
is congruent with our individual (see supra text accompanying notes 13-14) and institutional, (see HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 8, at vii-viii, 82-85, 95-96, 185-90, 254-55,
413-14, 480, 485-87), experience of intellect, and so provides vital theoretic connection between knowledge structures and the projects through which those structures live.
11N. BOLTON, CONCEPT FORMATION 2 (1977)(basic "division between sensory experience
on the one hand and ideas and hypotheses on the other"); see also infra note 32.
" HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 8, at 188.
32 This challenges a distinction, basic to the nomological tradition, between sensory data
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The Use of Models and Metaphors

Explanation consists chiefly in the application of models and metaphors."3 As we conceptualize phenomena, we draw upon the vocabulary of
"possible explanatory forms or patterns""4 that comprise our intellectual
heritage. It is fundamental, for example, that we conceptualize intangible
phenomena by projecting into them patterns we have experienced in our
contact with the physical world." Customarily, we resolve abstract phenomena into entities or substances, and into forces that bring about
movement or change in such entities or substances. 6 Scientific explanation often uses model and metaphor systems (e.g. "subtle fluid," "field
system," "corpuscular," "holographic") 3 7 that also are used in other
fields.38
For present purposes, the relevance of models and metaphors is that
they signify in the work of intellect: choicefulness, inherent in our selection from among the stock of models and metaphors available to us; creativity, in our developing and adapting metaphor systems to the particular
phenomena at hand; and an "extra-propositionalrationality"inherent in
the extra-propositional gestalts that comprise the structure of each model
and metaphor system.
C.

Law

At one level, the nonapodictic character of legal reasoning is a familiar
and well-accepted idea.39 Thus, legal scholars accept that legal reasoning

and our interpretation of those data. See CONSEQUENCES, supra note 8, at 3; MIRROR, supra
note 8, at 148-50. This distinction is crucial to philosophy as we know it. For only by separating data and concept, and positing the knowability or lawfulness of one, can we nomologically understand knowing. See MIRROR, supra note 8, at 172.
11 "It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions," MIRROR, supra note 8, at 12; G. LAKOFF and
M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3 (1981)("our ordinary conceptual system... is fundamentally metaphorical in nature"). See infra text accompanying notes 33-35. This is why
it is essential, for intellective self-understanding, to uncover metaphors that, so often without our awareness, guide our thought. See R. BERNSTEIN THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY 111, 233 (1976).
",See supra text accompanying note 20.
31 See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 176-79 (1981). Cf. N. BOLTON,
CONCEPT FORMATION 17-19 (1977).
36 Id.

" See. e.g., HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 8, at 255; F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT
passim (1982); THE HOLOGRAPHIC PARADIGM passim (K. Wilber ed. 1982); L. VON
BERTALANNFY, PERSPECTIVES ON A GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 12 (1975).
" HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 8, at 184-85, 255-56.
"' This is especially true with respect to our role as legal educators (see infra note 50), in
which we customarily tell our students legal issues have no clear answers, and the forms of
argument we chiefly teach (e.g., reasoning by analogy from precedent, cumulative weighing
of disparate "factors," and the like) are self-evidently nonapodictic.
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essentially is an endless dialogue and that, in studying and critiquing the

reasoning of judges, the scholar-critic is a kind of kibitzing "tenth
Justice."4
At a deeper level, however, the nomological scholarly ethos holds that
to study phenomena is to describe them in relation to laws that govern
their rationality. 4' Accordingly, the scholarly study of judicial decision
has centered on an effort to find it lawful in the sense either of logical
lawfulness or causal lawfulness.
1. Logical Lawfulness
Reflecting the dominance of the model of deductive logic in Western
thought, scholarly efforts to find legal reasoning logically lawful have centered on the model of a syllogism42 in which concepts (applicable rules)
are applied to data (facts of a particular case), to yield conclusions (legal
rights and obligations in the particular case).
Recognizing that judges do not simply apply ready-made rules of law,
scholars seek more sophisticated analyses of the "major premises" that
ought to control judicial reasoning. They seek theories, for example,
through which principles of value 43 or principles of institutional arrangement ' can serve as sources of major premise. Acknowledging that a degree of judicial "discretion" nonetheless does exist, scholars seek to discount such discretion as merely marginal and unusual in judicial decision
making."
2.

Causal Lawfulness

Two kinds of causal lawfulness are widely applied in the scholarly
study of judicial decision making. One is personalistic. Here, judicial decisions are understood as the product of beliefs, background, and other
"' The nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court are able and conscientious students of the law; yet, they rarely are unanimous in a case of any interest. The bulk of legal
scholarship treats issues of the kind addressed by courts, and while the scholarly articles are
written in much greater depth and scope than are judicial opinions, we recognize that the
basic modes of reasoning are the same.
" The nomological imperative, indeed, is stronger in law than in other fields of scholarship, inasmuch as the legitimacy of legal institutions depends on their decisions being lawful-that is, on their decisions not being chanceful or subjective. Counting ourselves as conservators of the judicial institution, we feel it our obligation to find and pronounce such
patterns of lawfulness.
"' See S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 96 (1958).
" See, e.g., H. HART, & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 122, 668-69 (tent. ed. 1958); Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 944 (1973);
Velvel, Suggested Approaches to Constitutional Adjudication and Apportionment, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1381 (1965).
- See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184-98 (1962).
" See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119-20 (1961). See generally Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
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characteristics of the judge."' The second is sociological, in which decisions are understood as caused by social forces-either by "political
forces" (in both a direct 7 and an indirect 48 sense) or by49organic societal
determination of the concepts with which judges reason.
3. Process and Choice: Perspective of the Deciding Judge
This quest for lawfulness, as important and as fruitful as it has been,
neglects the dimensions of choice and temporality."0 This neglect exem46 See Danelski, Toward Explanation of Judicial Behaviour, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 659
(1973).
4 Societal control is exercised directly in the sense that judges generally either are
elected, or are appointed by elected officials.
41 It is postulated, for example, that through "mechanisms of internalization" judges
come to absorb the "community consensus" or the "community agenda." Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political
Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 259 (1968). See also Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as A National Policy-Maker, 6 J PuB. L. 279, 285, 293-94 (1957).
'9

See infra, note 50.

A basic distinction is to be drawn between scholarly theory, on the one hand, and the
anti-theoretic of legal realism, on the other hand. The legal realists, in their ascendancy in
the period 1900-1940, overturned legal formalism (the idea that judicial decision is a matter
of applying pre-existing rules) which long had been the conventional theory of judicial decision. The legal realists asserted that judicial decision is essentially intuitive - a doing of
justice in the case at hand. See generally W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM; SKEPTICISM,
REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968).
The destruction of legal formalism accomplished, legal realists pursued the nomological
tradition principally through the causal determinism of social science. Classic expression of
the resulting perspective is E. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948)-the most
influential of all law school primers on legal reasoning-which locates lawfulness in a dynamic whereby society governs judicial decision by encoding its values in the concepts with
which judges reason. Id. at 6-8.
This leads, in turn, to the rather remarkable position taken by Levi in the quotation at
the head of this Article. This is a position in which a "naive confidence in established classification," S. HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 242 (1959), which otherwise is to be regarded
as an undesired obstacle to self-understanding, is embraced as an essential mechanism for
the control of judges. To be sure, this is "excellent sociology in as far as this is indeed the
principal manner in which societies convey and instill their values .... " E. GELLNER,
THOUGHT AND CHANGE 84 (1964). However, the relation it posits between the theorizing academic and the world (here, judges) seems unacceptable. Cf. Gross, The Theory of Judicial
Reasoning - Toward a Reconstruction, 66 Ky. L.J. 801, 819 n.107 (1978) (noting instances
of suggestion by legal scholars that we perpetuate the myth that judicial decision is essentially a matter of following rules).
Legal realism is a very strong force in the law schools today - indeed, it has been called
the "intellectual framework" of legal education. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the
Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248 (1978). The frankly instrumental and
anti-theoretic aspect of legal realism is softened in the law schools by a strong current of
rhetoric, cf. Kelman, The Past and Future of American Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 432, 434 (1983)("Law Day homilies"), asserting the transcendent character of legal
thought. See, e.g., Cramton, supra, at 251, 253, 257, 263 (rhetoric of transcendance invoked
against the precepts of legal realism). The conventional ideology of the law school classroom
80
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plifies a pattern basic to the nomological tradition.
Thus, it is fundamental to thought in the nomological tradition that
the word "reasoning" confounds two very different things: reasoning as
demonstration (or product) and reasoning as inquiry (or process). The
nomological paradigm is conceived in terms of reasoning as product. The
paradigm tells us what form the product of our inquiry is to take. To the
extent one's processes of inquiry can be understood as the application of
propositions within a nomological structure, those processes, too, conform
well to the nomological paradigm. However, the problem is that much
inquiry, including judicial deliberation, conforms poorly to this paradigm.
Yet, dominated by the nomological imperative, we strain to understand
inquiry in nomological terms. We strain to understand judicial reasoning,
for example, as the application of premises to facts.
When, however, we move to a dimension of "intellective interiority,"
congruent with the experience of the deciding judge, the process of inquiry assumes a different aspect. Rather than premises deductively leading to conclusions, the reality more nearly is that premises and conclusions interpenetrate, emerging "correlatively and tentatively"51 in
deliberation. Viewed from this "interior" perspective, too, the facts of the
case at hand and the resource of legal concept, are seen to interpenetrate
much as they do in science, in the sense that each is used to select, interpret, and inform the other. Finally, corresponding to the use of models
and metaphors in science, this perspective helps reconcile the logic of deduction with plastic and creative application of precedent in analogical
52
judicial reasoning.
The resulting conceptions of judicial decision are not ones calculated to
express "fetters that bind" 3 the judicial mind. Their purpose, rather, is
to pursue an epistemology of "interiority" that can guide the judicial
mind, and others who engage in legal reasoning, along paths of self-

wraps legal realist practice in "Law Day" rhetoric.
" Dewey, The Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L-Q. 23-24 (1924). Patterns of concept, data, and conclusion take shape wholistically in the judge's mind. This account requires one to understand the sense in which "discretion" is pervasive and paradigmatic in
judicial decision, the judge more like an artist painting a canvas than a mere follower of

rules.
" The quest for philosophically grounded theory that accommodates such reasoning
must be as far-reaching as the questions of knowledge and of rationality broached in this

Article. See, e.g., infra note 65 and accompanying text. The irony is that, while legal scholars pursue the nomological paradigm of natural science (see infra text accompanying notes
99-104) and seek nomologically defined theoretic fetters to control the openness of judicial
decision (see infra note 53), Stephen Toulmin shows us that the openness of judicial deci-

sion provides a paradigm for the work of natural science. See HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING,

supra

note 8, at 86-88, 94-95, 167-68, 498.
" See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision. The Elusive Quest for the Fetters
that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM L. REV. 359 (1975).
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54

understanding.

III.

THE IDEOLOGY OF ACADEMIC INTELLECT: TRUTH

Western philosophy traditionally has pursued the "objectivist" ideal
that there is an external, independently existing reality, and that we can
develop means to generate the set of propositions that truly describes
that reality." With the ascent of modern analytic empiricism, however,
the explicit theory of the academy increasingly has become the "nominal'
ist"56
view that we accept our propositional structures not because they
are "true," but because they work in performing functions of prediction,
explanation, or control. This makes the ideal of truth "hollow" because,
in accepting one set of propositions, we understand that another, entirely
different set might perform those functions just as well. This granted,
how can we ever say we have found-indeed, how can we meaningfully
say we are pursuing-the "truth"?
While it may seem that the relativism and purposivism embraced by
this Article lead necessarily to the nominalist positions, this Article argues to the contrary, as follows. The ideal of truth-seeking is not fallacious. Instead, it is our theories, no longer able to understand the ideal,
that are at fault. Thus, through modern analytic empiricism, the nomological tradition has divorced its theoretic-and therefore our intellectual
self-understanding-from a belief in truth that (as presently will be
shown) is the actual ideology of inquiring intellect.5 7 The fact that one
"believes in" the pursuit of truth lacks intellectual significance-indeed,
the belief itself appears intellectually indefensible-if, as the nominalist
perspective of contemporary nomological thought tells us, we are pursuing a chimera.
But, assuming this is a problem, how could we respond? The first step
is to note the genesis of our situation. As set in the traditional ideology of
truth, the meaning of the word "objectivism" opposes it to nominalism.
However, a subtle shift has occurred in modern analytic empiricism
whereby "objective" has come to mean simply "non-subjective"; to mean
public, replicable, and lawful, as opposed to private and nonrational.5 8
This shift away from the original sense of "objectivism" (which, for clar-

See infra note 174 ("open theory" vs. "closed theory").
"Objectivism" is "any of various philosophical doctrines that stress the external, independent existence of what is perceived or known." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 981
'

(2d ed. 1972). See also infra note 65. Cf. Realism, "the doctrine that universals or abstract
terms are objectively actual: opposed to nominalism." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
supra, at 1182.
" "Nominalism" is "a doctrine.., that all universal or abstract terms are mere necessities of thought or conveniences of language and therefore exist as names only and have no
general realities corresponding to them." Id. at 965. See in/ra text accompanying note 61.
" For the sense in which this is so, see infra text following note 61.
" See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ity, we now call the "objectivist-realist" position) toward the second
(nominalist) sense in our working theoretic of academic intellect, has not
seemed important because it does not matter to the nomological tradition.69 From the perspective of the nomological tradition, what matters is
that knowledge be expressed in nomological structures, without concern
for how one conceives the relationship between those structures and the
reality to which they refer.
This shows the sense in which the ideal of truth-seeking has lost its
theoretic grounding because of the conception, basic to both the objectivist-realist and the nominalist versions of the nomological tradition, that
thought, language, and reality are phenomena "out there." That conception makes the question of truth the question of an "out there" relationship between language and thought on one hand, and reality on the other.
It makes the crucial question whether we can identify some propositions
as the ones that are a true mirror of, or-to change the metaphor-that
truly hook onto, 60 reality. The objectivist-realist and the nominalist perspectives reach opposite conclusions on that question; but, equally bound
by the nomological tradition, they conceive the issue identically.
A thesis of this Article is that truth-seeking can recover its theoretic
grounding only by embracing dimensions of "subjective" internal experience that the nomological tradition has led us to neglect. Pursuing this
thesis, let us consider the following standard statement of modern scientific nominalism:
For Newton, science was a voyage of discovery on an uncharted
sea. The objective of the voyage was to discover the islands of
truth. The truths existed in nature. Contemporary science has
been hard put to shake the yoke of this dogma. [We must understand, however, that][sicience and common sense inquiry alike do
not discover the ways in which events are grouped in the world,
they invent ways of grouping.'
Now, the question is this: as he wrote those words, did Jerome Bruner
believe them to be true? As he wrote those words, did it matter to him, at
the deepest levels of self, that he did believe them to be true?
The evident answer to both questions, yes, is rooted in the fact that
intrinsic to cognition is a belief that our conceptions are so. The paradox
that this applies, also, to assertions of the nominalist position leads us to
see that we are immersed in language and thought in ways we cannot
escape. To be sure, conceptualization of a subject done at one moment
("moment A") always can be reconsidered during a subsequent moment

" It matters to philosophers, see infra note 65, but in this aspect, the enterprise of philosophy grows increasingly esoteric and removed from the rest of academic inquiry. Id.
o This metaphor is used in MIRROR, supra note 8. See, e.g., id. at 265, 385.
j. BRUNER, A STUDY OF THINKING 7 (1956).
J'
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("moment B"). Bruner, thus, can look at the passage quoted above and
observe that it, too, is merely a construct of his devising; but this does not
mean that statements in "moment B" signify freedom from immersion.
For in moment B one is no less immersed in the reflection of that
moment.
The nomological tradition, whether in its objectivist-realist or its nominalist form, holds centrally that we can transcend subjective experience
through an objectivizing intellect. Neither the objectivist-realist nor the
nominalist version of nomological thought ascribes theoretic significance
to "subjective states" such as immersion or belief.
To be sure, our conception of intellect must accommodate the aspect of
ourselves as nominalists in which we posit a cognitive reality of our own
making. Equally, however, it also must accommodate the significance of
our belief in, and commitment to, the truth of our conceptions as we experience them.
It follows that the ideal of truth must be grounded in the aspirations
and commitments of intellective "I". In this view, the theoretic of the
ideal of truth is to be found in conceptions that describe not relationships
between propositions and reality, but our own relationship, the relationship of intellective self, to the project of seeking truth..
In the nomological tradition, intellection and valuing seem unalterably3
separate realms 2 or, at least, their reconciliation seems a distant hope.1
But this is because we have viewed both intellection and valuing from a
posture of objectivized intellect that manifests and perpetuates their separation. 4 Specifically, we conceive ourselves as observers of, rather than
as participants in, the phenomena of intellect, and so have lost the power
to generate "objective" conceptions of intellect congruent with its "subjective" valuings and aspirations.
The proposed shift negates, by "subjectivizing," the ideal of truth only
from the perspective of the nomological tradition itself. Such shifts are
characteristic of the broader project in which we are now engaged: reunderstanding the intellective ideals by which we live."

"I See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1685, 1712 passim (1976)(rule and value as inherently antinomous components of

judicial decision-making).
63 See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 143 (1975)(integrative conceptions of
which "we have only the faintest awareness"); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the
Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 654
(1973)(a "form of thought which . . . may not be within reach in the foreseeable future").
" A basic thrust of post-nomological thought is to challenge the necessity, viability, utility, and morality of this dichotomy. See infra Section VII B(3)("Moral Being vs.

Technologism").
61 Cf. S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 234-45 (1958) (arguing that our conception of
"reason" should be freed from domination by an apodictic ideal that in fundamental ways
has distorted our understanding of what human reasoning is). See also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 103, 107-11, 124, 141-44 (1975); C. PERELMAN & L OLRRECHTS-TYTECA,
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It seems the final nausea to understand that, with such shifts, we create
ourselves. But this nausea is due to loss of an orientation to which we had
grown accustomed: that embodied in nomological conceptions of intellect,
reason, and truth. To paraphrase the quotation that stands at the head of
this Article, it may seem that people "should not be particularly bright,"
since otherwise we will recognize that the conceptions by which we live
are of our creation, and will change them unwisely or too often. But such
is to suggest we live unconsciously, and there can be no turning back to
that.
IV.

THE IDEOLOGY OF ACADEMIC INTELLECT: LIBERAL EDUCATION

Today, liberal education primarily means general education. This corresponds to the precept that breadth of knowledge humanizes, and that
to pursue "liberal studies" is to pursue knowledge for its own sake. While,
of course, there is merit to this ideological strand of liberal education, its

THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 1-10 (1969); Tribe, Technology Assess-

ment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L.
REV. 617, 617, 654 (1973). See generally, Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to Go Around?
An Essay on the Unspoken Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 475 (1978).
In Western thought, philosophy has sought to superintend the theoretic of intellect, reason, and truth. Thus, what traditionally has differentiated philosophy from science is that
philosophy seeks theories of knowledge, (i.e. criteria for deciding what true knowing is), that
provide a foundation for science. MIRROR, supra note 8, at 132. Becoming properly "scientific" and "rigorous" under the aegis of modern analytic empiricsm, philosophy today signifies analytic method of no certain content. Consequences, supra note 8, at 215-17, 221; MIR-

ROR, supra note 8 at 5. Thus, the philosophy that sired modern analytic empiricism has
been "devoured by it own offspring," (W. BARRETT, THE ILLUSION OF TECHNIQUE 24 (1978)),

and the idea that philosophy gives the rest of us criteria for true knowing becomes increasingly removed from reality. See MIRROR, supra note 8, at 5. Because analytic philosophy
exists as the search for such criteria, (id. at 131-311 [especially pp. 132, 171-72], 340 n.20),
philosophers today pursue their arguments about true knowing, see e.g., id. (describing con-

temporary analytic philosophy, in its various forms and applications), while the rest of us
turn to nominalism.
Richard Rorty, rejecting the traditional ideal of truth, (see CONSEQUENCES, supra note 8,
at xiii-xvii, 3-17), is right to fault that ideal for producing an "objectionable self-confidence," (MIRROR, supra note 8, at 386), that leads to stuckness - to the idea that inquiry
stops whenever we find out what really is so, and that we are now accomplishing this for
many of the topics we address nomologically. Id. at 377, 386-87. But much of this problem,
it appears, arises because we identify truth with "out there" propositions about how things
are.

Rorty accepts truth as an ideal when it is understood as "no more and no less than the
best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on." Id. at 385. But what
such an ideal adds to nominalism is not clear; indeed, elsewhere Rorty dismisses the word
truth as an "empty compliment" we pay our current beliefs. Id. at 10.
Surely the matter can't end there. When Rorty posits the "best idea we currently have
about how to explain ... ," to what dimension of normative distinction does he refer? Philosophical inquiry is, as Rorty states, a dialogue we are fated to pursue as long as "sparks fly
upward." Id. at 389. But why do we each go on? What do we each seek? With no name for
that, how can we speak intelligibly about the soul of intellect?
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limitations are expressed in a second precept holding that mere knowledge is not the point, and that what counts is the formation of "charac-

ter" 6 or of "an active methodical intelligence [that is] . . . able to think

.. . about unfamiliar matters. 81 7 This is the ideal of an education that
prepares people to "realize [their] potentialities to the full;"6 involves
"the whole range of human potentialities, functions, and satisfactions; 9
and presents educators with "questions about human beings as such."7
The goal is "to nurture the traits of mind and spirit characteristic of
those who have achieved a consistent view of themselves and the complex
physical and social world in which they live. "71
It is fair to say that in American universities today, liberal education is
drowning in vocationalism (that is, in concern with preparation for specific occupational roles), and in the increasingly specialized research interests of faculty. 72 These forces-vocationalism and specialized academic

interests-both are aspects of what we will call "technologism." In the
academy, technologism means education intended as preparation for deploying the particular methodologies and pursuing the particular ends
that define what it is to be "competent" within a given vocation or academic discipline. Academics readily recognize the technologism present in
preparation for nonacademic vocational pursuits. We may be less able to
recognize the comparably narrow vocationalism present in preparation for
a career in an academic discipline.
To understand the significance of technologism, one must see the sense
in which it encompasses privatism. Presented often in opposition to the
cognitive, instrumental, and technological, "privatism" stresses themes of
subjective, personal, emotive, nonverbal and mystical self. Principal ex-73
pressions of this ethos in Western thought are humanistic psychology,
and a variety of psychological-religious-poetic accounts of self and of in74
terpersonal connection.

00

C. WEGENER, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY

83 (1978).

Bowra, The Idea of a Liberal Arts College, 50 LIBERAL EDUC. 185, 188 (1964)(Bulletin
of the Association of American Colleges).
17

" Id. at 187.
09

C. WEGENER, supra note 66 at 78.

70 Id.

71 E. MCGRATH, THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 2
(1959).
72 See, e.g., newspaper account of January 1984 annual meeting of Association of American Colleges, presenting as lead story that "in the view of many of the nearly 450 college
and university administrators" in attendance, the liberal arts have become a "disaster area"
in American higher education because "colleges and universities have become so preoccupied with training students for jobs and with encouraging professors to pursue arcane research specialities." Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 1984, pt. 1, at 3, col. 3.
73 See, e.g., C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951); A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1968).
74 See, e.g., M. BUBER, I AND THOU

dhism, in

(1958); F.

FROMM,

Psychoanalysis and Zen Bud-

ZEN BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (1960).
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Technologism embodies a dualism that divorces intellect from self in
the following manner: technologism claims intellect for the domain of the
technological, while ceding self to privatism. 5 Privatism, claiming self,
cedes intellect to the technological.7 In these conceptions, privatism and
the technological define each other and, together, reinforce the objectivesubjective duality that is central to the nomological tradition.
One consequence is that educators, our professional identities increasingly defined in terms of competence in the nomological structures of our
fields, feel neither qualified nor chartered to meddle with students' emotive-conative selves. Therefore, the ideal of liberal education, rooted in
those selves, is lost, like the ideal of truth, to the explicit theoretic of
academic intellect. Now, one can fault this duality-more specifically, one
can fault the technological as dehumanizing or self-alienating, 77 and
privatism as anti-intellectual or narcissistic.78 Such critique, however, is
of limited use unless it leads somewhere.
Again, the starting place is to see how we arrived at our present situation. A concomitant of modern analytic empiricism is that, with the elaboration of our work into specialized research disciplines, academics increasingly are removed from what it is to be intellect-and-self in the
world outside the academy, or indeed, in other disciplines within the
academy.
The preeminent theoretician of liberal education, John Dewey, sought
79
ways to understand intellect in terms meaningful outside the academy.
He sought approaches to education whereby values accepted as the ends
of liberal education meaningfully refer to what it is that people do in
their lives. While Dewey's prescriptions are of limited use to the present
inquiry," the key point is that Dewey was wrestling with the problem
that matters: the problem of intellect, self, and being in the world.
Dewey's quest can be understood as a search for ways to understand
higher education that: (a) express a culture of intellectual community-a
culture common (i) among academic disciplines, and (ii) within and without the academy; and (b) have programmatic as well as theoretic signifi-

75 See W. BARRETT supra note 65, at 191 (underlying "the technological era" is intellect's
insistence on attending only to that which is "measurable, numerable and calculable.")
70 See M. BUBER, supra note 74, at 3-14 (dichotomizing the world of ideas and the world
of direct relation, and asserting the primacy of the latter); E. FROMM, supra note 74, at 11011, 132-33 (asserting as the "highest form" of knowing the direct conscious experience which

occurs without intellection and reflection-similar to the "intuition" posited by Spinoza).
" See, e.g., W. BARRETT supra note 65, at 212-19.
"0See, e.g., C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1983); Marin, The New Narcissism,
1975, at 47.
See, e.g., A WIRTH, EDUCATION

HARPER'S, Oct.
7

IN

THE

TECHNOLOGICAL

SOCIETY:

THE VOCATIONAL-

LIBERAL STUDIES CONTROVERSY IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 169-217 (1971).

0 The degree of Dewey's faith in scientific method, popular democracy, and mass education, and in the way those three principles could be combined (see id. at 182-206), is anachronistic in relation to Western society as we now know it.
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cance for higher education.
There must be many ways to understand higher education that are
responsive to this quest. The remainder of this Article will pay much attention to one such idea, to be called here "self-reflective learning." Responsive to emphases of goal and concept-especially to themes of intellective interiority-that are the focus of this Article, "self-reflective
learning" means learning that is characterized by "a persistent shifting
back and forth between doing something and thinking about doing something-or [better yet] . . . between thinking about something and thinking about the thinking, until the moments become so normally related
they are no longer sharply distinguished . . . ."'
We tend to conceive reflection as using knowledge to achieve understanding. This contrasts with the focus of self-reflective learning, for
which the "moment of philosophizing""2 is not an application of philosophy to self, but is a way that intellect relates to self; it is manifested in
qualities of mind corresponding to reflective, perceptive, and self-aware
intellect.
The sine qua non for teaching and learning so conceived is intellect
understood as being in the world-intellect, that is, as being in our
projects. The meaning of that idea becomes tangible only in relation to
concrete settings in higher education. The remainder of this Article develops "self-reflective learning" in the specific context of legal education.
First, however, it briefly describes current patterns of thought and practice in legal education, in terms of which the significance of self-reflective
learning must be understood.
V.

PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY THEMES OF CRITIQUE AND REFORM IN
LEGAL EDUCATION

A professional lifetime in the law must be projected in terms that are
broad and open. This follows from the wide range of tasks that "general
legal practice" entails, the diversity of professional roles in addition to
legal practice that law school graduates commonly undertake, and the
fact that laws, legal institutions, and their social context, continually and
rapidly change. Therefore, the crucial question for law schools is, In what
terms are we to conceive the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that comprise the goals of a coherent program of general legal education? Broadly
speaking, the way we answer that question today may be found in the
three broad classifications-"doctrinal," "theoretic," and "practical"-into which we divide our thought about law school instruction.
Most law school courses are "doctrinally" defined in that they are
named for, and cover, one of the subject matter (doctrinal) categories into

"l
82

C. WEGENER, supra note 66, at 97.
Id. at 138.
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which substantive law is divided in our thought and practice. In addition
to teaching students fundamental principles of its subject matter, a major
purpose of each such course is to help develop (typically, through use of
the casebook method of instruction)"3 skills required in applying substantive law to problem situations. These skills, sometimes referred to collectively as "thinking like a lawyer," will be referred to here as "doctrinal
skills."
The great emphasis in our general degree program, then, is on instruction in doctrine and doctrinal skills through the casebook method. Nonetheless, for years there has been widespread agreement that, while sound
as applied to the first year of law school, this approach is progressively
84
less adequate through the second and third years.
Thus, the first year of law school has a prescribed curriculum whose
subject matter is self-evidently important because it is the foundation for
subsequent law study. Moreover, doctrinal skills instruction is rewarding
in the first year, since, starting with little such skill, students typically
undergo striking cognitive development during the year. But these conditions change markedly in the second and third years of law school. In
those years, doctrinal skills teaching and learning occur at a much-reduced level of rigor and of individual growth. 5 Additionally, in the second and third years, the prescribed curriculum of the first year gives way

11The principal assigned reading generally is a casebook, containing edited appellate
judicial opinions and a wide range of commentary, problems, and questions pertaining to
the cases and to the issues they address.
" See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 139 (1951);
STOLZ, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review, in
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW: 1971, 142, 143 (1971)(Report of the
Curriculum Study Project Committee of the Association of American Law Schools); Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4-6 (1964); Stone,
Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392, 407 n.50 (1971).
" See, e.g., Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education:An Agenda for Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 276 (1974). Rather early in their law school career, many
students conclude they have grasped the essentials of doctrinal skills learning and correspondingly reduce their effort. Id. at 277. Our three-year law school program fosters this

pattern. Thus, after the rigorous Socratic case class of the first-year, a common teaching
mode of the second and third years is one that has been called the "avuncular Socratic"
(Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL Enuc. 321, 328 (1982))
which demands, and receives, a lesser level of preparation and in-class performance by students. See also 1. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 162
(1977)(study suggesting that law school classes are less interactive than we generally suppose). Once students have passed out of the first year, they become "yearling priests" of the
law school community, who minister to the first-year neophytes beneath them. See K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 130-31. Our system of education does not significantly differentiate students who are at the beginning of their second year from those who are at the end
of their third year. The most comprehensive reconsideration of the general degree program
by the present generation of American law teachers concluded that two years should be
enough. See infra text accompanying note 143.
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to a "bewildering array""6 of elective courses, reflecting no "structure or
theory" of curriculum design.8
Therefore, the consensus today is that the domination of doctrinal
8
skills instruction must give way, in the second and third years, at least,
to a blend that adequately treats the practical dimension, conceived
chiefly as applied skills8 9 instruction, and the theoretical dimension, conceived as intellectual breadth and depth. 0
A.

The Practical Dimension

During the 1970s both the bench and bar exerted considerable pressure
on American law schools to devote more attention to practical skills training."1 This attention did not address, however, what might have seemed
the crucial question: What dependable minimum of practical skills competence should our graduates have?92 The question was not addressed because it appeared to defy answer. Thus, in light of (a) the expense of
practical skills training (due to the large number of instructor hours it
requires), (b) the number of different skill categories to be covered, and
(c) the high value placed on, and therefore the time devoted to, doctrinal

8e

Boyer & Cramton, supra note 85, at 230.
The suggestion has been made that we have abandoned "collective responsibility

87 Id.

* . . for the curriculum as a whole." Cramton, supra note 85, at 327; Sandalow, The Moral
Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 164 (1984)("disarray of . . the curriculum" is a symptomatic of a "larger failure": the seeming inability of the law schools "to
address fundamental issues concerning the goals of legal education").
An underlying problem is that the principal scholarly interest of law professors is the
study of particular doctrinal fields. This specialized interest, as Karl Llewellyn rather excoriatingly put the matter, tends to make doctrinal instruction in the second and third years
an "instrument for producing unplanned concentration of good teachers' minds on propo""gating, at all costs, tiny, mostly unimportant, intricacies of narrow positive doctrine." K.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 384 (1962). See also infra
text following footnote 105. The result is that the teacher's enthusiasm far exceeds that of
the student-creating a gap we seem unable to bridge and, worse, sometimes unwilling to
address. See Strauss, Teaching Administrative Law: The Wonder of the Unknown, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 6 (1983).
88 The expanded approaches referred to in the text following this footnote are not confined to the second and third year curriculum. See, e.g., Brest, A First-Year Course in
'Lawyering Process', 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344, 344, 350 (1982).
" Applied skills include: legal drafting; negotiation; litigation: appellate advocacy; litigation: trial preparation; litigation: trial practice; interviewing and counseling; legal planning
and counseling.
18 See Gorman, Legal Education At the End of the Century: An Introduction, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC.315, 319 (1982).
"' See LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE SPECIAL COMMI'rEE FOR A STUDY

OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIA-

10-13 (1980).
88 See infra note 155 (first paragraph). Compare Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal
Education, 45 COLUM L. REV. 345, 345 (1945)("reliable and minimum professional competence")(emphasis in original).
TION
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instruction, it appears impossible that our goal could be any minimum
level of competence in the various categories of practical skills used in
lawyering.
In addition, we have tended to assume without question the inviolability of the elective character of the second and third year curriculum,9 3
perhaps not fully accepting that our students' interest in freedom of
course selection might need to give way to the public's interest in a dependable minimum of professional competence in our graduates.
While there has been substantial growth in the number and size of applied skill courses, the primary emphasis increasingly has shifted to a
"pervasive" approach, whereby in doctrinal courses, students are
presented with problems that require use of one or another of the applied

skills.9 4 Though there are benefits to the pervasive approach,", it has two
serious weaknesses. First, it does not provide a dependable minimum of
applied skills coverage, thus leaving to chance which skill categories the
student encounters during the law school years. Second, it does not present practical skills as conceptually coherent wholes. The fragmentary encounters characteristic of the pervasive method do not merely fail to develop patterns of conceptually coherent skills learning, they may suggest
to students that such learning is unfeasible or unimportant 0

1 Given that serious questions have been raised about the adequacy of the core education being received by our students, (see, e.g., Cramton, Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 321, 327 (1982)(questioning whether our graduates have "the basic
knowledge, skills and attitudes that any decent lawyer should be expected to have"); Boyer
& Cramton, supra note 85, at 231 (questioning whether "the law schools are inculcating a
common professional culture, a common core of values and knowledge"), and the fact that
expanding the core (i.e., required) curriculum seems one obvious response, see, e.g., Gorman,
supra note 90, at 319-20), there are remarkably few references to this idea in the legal education literature. Faculty and students wish to maintain the diversity of the upper level
curriculum, since this permits faculty to teach in areas of their scholarly interest (see supra
note 87), and students to learn in areas of their personal, or anticipated professional,
interest.
"4See, e.g., Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering - Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 566-72 (1976); Developments, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 282,
283-84 (1982).
g This approach can improve doctrinal skills learning by putting problems of doctrinal
interpretation and application into the real-world contexts in which students will encounter
them as professionals. This means that students think about doctrine, as one commentator
has put it, the way lawyers do, "tactically" (Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside
Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EIUC.
506, 514 (1982)), so that students are learning not to "think like law professors" (id. (emphasis omitted)), but to think like lawyers.
By the same token, the pervasive approach can deepen practical skills learning by placing
applied skills problems in a specific doctrinal context currently being studied. The use of
large-class doctrinal courses for such instruction means that more students are exposed to
practical skills learning at a much-reduced cost.
" The problem is one of conceptual focus and coherence in law study. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-14. A concern one has is that history is repeating itself. The perva-
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Use of the pervasive method is further complicated by the fact that
many law professors have substantial reservations about law school instruction in applied skills. Thus, while virtually all accept that some
amount of practical instruction is necessary, many feel that applied skills
basically should be learned through experience after graduation because
(a) it is extremely difficult for law schools to teach applied skills," and
(b) it is the proper function (and more than sufficient challenge) of the
law school years to lay an intellectual foundation for the student's subsequent professional life. This view is especially strong in the "more
respected" law schools whose programs and faculty heavily influence the
self-image and aspirations of the legal education profession.
This view is deeply grounded. Law schools wish to be honored members
of the academic community and not to be viewed as trade schools. This is
not simply a matter of appearance or of status; it corresponds to a genuine aspiration
to be academic. Many law faculty, it has been observed, are
"refugees" 98 from the pedestrianism and moral ambiguity of practice;
having fled that environment, they resist its introduction to the law
school. A final constraint on practical training in law schools is that, especially under the presently favored "pervasive" approach, such training
competes directly with the theoretic dimension for the time and attention
of law professors in their courses.
B.

The Theoretic Dimension

Our conception of intellectual breadth and depth, as a dimension to be
added to the law school program, has come increasingly to include social
science. This has led to an increase in social science courses, often in a
form colloquially called "law and . . ." (e.g. "law and economics," "law

sive approach that today seems the wave of the future, (see also infra discussion of "intellectual breadth and depth") was persuasively critiqued forty years ago by a leading legal
educator:
The modern complexity of material is accompanied also by an increase in the
range and type of problem in our classes: dabs of legal history, of jurisprudence,
large chunks of the problems of judicial policy, problems of counseling suggested

by the instructor's experience or the annotations of the casebook, materials of economic or of social or political background - all these come in, but they come in
helter-skelter: 'The place for that is not a separate course; it ought to be part of
every course'."
Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, supra note 92, at 355.
97 Not only is the individual attention entailed in practice and feedback expensive, critics point out that inside the law school it is difficult to replicate the real-world conditions
under which one learns to do the applied tasks of lawyering. Paradoxically, the more prestigious, wealthier schools that can best afford such instruction tend to be less interested in
it. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum,J. LEGAL EDuc. 312, 325-26 (1982).
See also text following this footnote.
" Simon, Homo Psychologicus:Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REv. 488,
552-53 (1980).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss3/14

28

1984-851

INTELLECT BEYOND LAW

and psychology").9 9 However, such courses-each taken by relatively few
students and at no designated point in their law school career-do not
provide a foundation on which teachers in other courses can build. Thus,
as in the case of practical skills, emphasis has come to be placed on the
pervasive method; that is, on integrating social science perspectives into
doctrinal courses. 1°0 However, this also has serious weaknesses. One's understanding of a discipline should be built by systematic assimilation of
its basic principles of substance and method. Instead, in the pervasive
method, students encounter disciplines in a way that tends to produce
fragmentary and superficial understanding of them. Further, as the application of social science perspectives to law becomes more developed, it
becomes progressively less feasible for law teachers not specializing in a
1
With regiven discipline to incorporate it into their doctrinal courses.
spect to teachers who do specialize, instruction through the pervasive
method becomes less satisfying to the teacher' 01 and/or less comprehensible to the student. '0 3
An assumption that underlies the use of social science to increase intellectual breadth and depth in the law school program is that students are
to adopt the empirical-theoretic perspective that animates the work of
scholarly systems-building. However, especially in the pervasive method,
the student's focus is more often on instrumental application of whatever
°4
bits of social science learning are relevant to the problem at hand.

1,See Cavers, Signs of Progress: Legal Education, 1982, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 33, 43
(1983)(indicating prominence of economics, and of sociology, psychology, and psychiatry,
among social science subjects treated in such courses.)
'0ooSee, e.g., Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education,
33 J. LEGAL EIUC. 247, 254-65 (1983); Cavers, supra note 99 at 43. This follows generally
from the long term movement of the casebook method toward encompassing a wider range
of materials and perspectives. See supra note 96.
101See Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA_ L, REV. 637,
647 (1968).
102 "The serious social scientist in a law school resembles the artist who delivers letters to
pay the bills. Teaching becomes a job." George L. Priest, Oral Presentation to the Plenary
Session, Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Cincinnati (January,
1983)(official audio transcription)(omitted in edited text later published, see infra note
103).
"I Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33
J. LEGAL EOUC. 437, 440 (1983)("the low level of theoretical training and interest of law
students frequently makes one wonder whether the effort is worthwhile") (edited version of
oral presentation, see supra note 102).
104 There is an important difference between study pursued "on its own terms and for its
own sake" (Dean Terrance Sandalow, Oral Presentation to the Section on Teaching Methods of the Association of American Law Schools, Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools (January 1981)(official audio transcription)), and study pursued for
instrumental application. Id. When it is proposed that law professors take a leave of absence
for self-education in fields such as "economics, sociology, criminology, philosophy, mathematics, computer technology, or some branch of the physical sciences" (Allen, One Aspect of
the Problem of Relevance in Legal Education, 54 VA. L. REv. 595, 599 (1968)), one can only

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985

29

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:391

In addition to social science, the other principal resource for intellectual breadth and depth in the law school curriculum is legal scholarship
in the rationalist-jurisprudential tradition. This scholarship covers a spectrum extending from doctrinal critique (in which the nomological faith is
that through rigorous reasoning we can apodictically critique judicial decisions and identify correct doctrinal results), to jurisprudential systemsbuilding (in which the nomological faith is that we can create generalized
nomological structures-e.g., theories of justice-from which normative
conclusions of law or morals can be logically drawn).
The great bulk of published legal scholarship is at the former end of
the spectrum. Law school professors are identified chiefly as specialists in
particular doctrinal fields and are expected to demonstrate and share
that expertise. Being principally"0 5 an exercise in doctrinal skill, this
scholarship embodies and perpetuates our emphasis in legal education on
doctrinal skills.
While the scholarship of jurisprudential systems-building enters the
law school arena indirectly as conceptual background for work of law
professors in scholarship and in teaching, its presence in the curriculum
occurs, like social science, through (a) special subject (legal theory)
courses, and (b) pervasive incorporation into doctrinal courses. For essentially the same reasons as those cited above with respect to social science,
jurisprudential scholarship has limited effect as a source of intellectual
breadth and depth in the general degree program. 0 6

suppose that the principal application of such learning in legal education would be in the
instrumental dimension described by Dean Sandalow in the following terms: "Today one
cannot practice anti-trust law or environmental law without having a knowledge of economics. One cannot really practice labor law without having some knowledge of statistics. One
cannot practice in the personal injury field without having acquired a good deal of information about human biology . . ." Sandalow, supra. Such instrumentally-oriented instruction
is of course, valuable, but we need to be clear about its limitations as a source of "intellec-

tual breadth and depth".
00 The text refers to legal scholarship as located on a "spectrum" because, in varying
degrees, doctrinal scholarship incorporates modes characteristic of the jurisprudential. This
often is the case, for example, with respect to constitutional law scholarship, which presents
basic issues of social theory (see, e.g., supra notes 43-44), or new and open fields such as
environmental law. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973). With the importance
now accorded social science learning in law, doctrinal scholarship increasingly includes this
element as well.
l06 See supra note 96. The more basic problem is the increasing distance between specialized nomological scholarship on the one hand, and intellect in the world on the other. Robert Stevens sounds a crucially important theme when he observes that legal scholarship has
come to display a "remarkable dependence on dictating and constraining theories" (Stevens,
American Legal Scholarship:Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 442, 447 (1983))(replacing former orthodoxies of "black-letter law" with new
orthodoxies of "black-letter theory"). Id. See also Francis Allen's suggestion that legal
scholarship is producing "a body of literature curiously remote from actual social purposes
and dynamics." Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J. LE-
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The root problem is the same with respect to jurisprudential scholarship and social science scholarship. This problem can be understood in
terms of the way we present to our students the nomological structures of
our scholarship. This can be paraphrased as follows:
You are encountering-for the most part serendipitously
throughout the curriculum-increasingly "high tech" systems of
nomological structure, from the jurisprudence of Rawls to the
psychology of emotive self. Each nomological structure, increasingly, claims normative and descriptive self-sufficiency. While we
help you out, sometimes, with special discipline and interdisciplinary courses, essentially it is up to you to put it together and to
make it your own. Yet, in substantial part, "putting it together"
is not the point. These years of law school are intended to awaken
your mind to what it is to understand the world of laws and legal
institutions. We believe that the various nomological perspectives
-however piecemeal your encounters with them-will serve this
purpose, and will enable you to inform your personal and professional life with the scholarly perspectives of critical, broadly
thoughtful, inquiring mind.
The problem with this message is that, in fact, students are graduating:
(a) with a keen sense that social science, like the technology of
reasoning, matters chiefly in immediate and instrumental ways chiefly (i) in constructing, as advocate, arguments about causes
and consequences in the world, and (ii) in exercising control over
information, institutions, and individuals so as to serve one's client's ends; and
(b) with little understanding what these nomological structures,
singly or in the aggregate, otherwise might signify in one's intellectual and professional life.

EDuc. 403, 405 (1983). See also infra note 181.
John Rawls derives principles of justice from a mind experiment in which people consensually construct a society before knowing what roles they themselves will play in the social
order. J_ RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-92 (1971). The economic analyst derives measures
of economic worth from a mind experiment in which people bargain, in abstractu, as potential adversaries in a personal injury suit. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOmics 37 (1983). Ronald Dworkin posits a judge of "superhuman" skill, learning, patience
and acumen and, identifying the sort of data such an intellect could assimilate, develops a
theory of judicial decision that incorporates such modes of decision-making. Dworkin, Hard
GAL

Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1975).

The issue is not whether such scholarship is useful and important in its own sphere.
Rather, as the text following this footnote suggests, the issue is how such scholarship is to
enter the lives of our students in ways that will "provide the theoretical bases ... a serious
profession needs." Stevens, supra, at 448. See also infra note 181.
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Conclusion

The foregoing problems have a wide range of causes and consequences,
for which there are no simple solutions. The particular focus of this Article is on the question with which the section began: In what terms are we
to conceive the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that comprise the goals of
a coherent program of general legal education?
From that perspective, the matter of most interest is the way in which
the categories "doctrinal," "theoretic," and "practical" dominate our
thought and practice. In particular, what is of concern is the extent to
which intellect and intellectual development are understood exclusively
as (a) doctrinal skill and (b) scholarly theoretic (which, in turn, is understood in terms of nomological system). The thesis of this Article is that
there are ways to understand intellect and intellectual development that
can help us move beyond conceptions of legal education whose limitations
now seem to entrap us.
Having assessed in general terms the situation of higher education, this
Article suggested that "self-reflective learning" is an idea that can usefully broaden our conception of intellect and of intellectual development.
We return now to the idea of self-reflective learning, to elaborate it in
terms that, while including reference to legal education and to problems
we have just considered, apply to higher education generally. Suggesting
conceptions of intellect that can help us better define and pursue the
goals of general legal education, self-reflective learning responds to our
need for an ideology of intellect that establishes commonality between
the academy and the world outside.
VI.

SELF-REFLECTIVE LEARNING

Increasingly, one finds suggestions in the literature that law schools
should instruct students in the "skill of learning.' 1 °0 The rationale for
such instruction is evident enough: given the breadth of the tasks lawyers
perform and the context of continual change in which they perform them,
what could be more important than an ability to acquire needed knowledge and skills on one's own after graduation? To the limited extent developed in the law schools, instruction in the "skill of learning" occurs
mainly in the setting of clinical legal education, where it is identified with
"experiential learning"-that is, with learning through real life experience

"' See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 90, at 315, 319; Cramton, supra note 85, at 321, 323.
Klare, The Law School Curriculum in the 1980's: What's Left, 32 J,LEGAL EDuc. 336, 341

(1982); Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to
Learn From Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV.
284 (1981); LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 10 (1979)(Report and Recommendations of a Task Force of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar); Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.612, 613 (1984).
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as opposed to learning in the classroom.' 8
"Self-reflective learning" is an aspect of, or better, a way of understanding, the skill of learning. As will be seen, it views all learning as
"experiential" in the sense that it views learning as a function of the way
one relates to one's experience. What follows, therefore, conceives the
skill of learning in a way that is as applicable to academic (i.e., "classroom" and "book") learning, as it is to learning in the workplace.
A.

Basic Concepts of Self-Reflective Learning

Whether an action is physical (e.g., swimming) or cognitive (e.g., briefing a case), one can think about the action while engaged in it (to guide
how one does it), or after one has engaged in it (to consider how one
might do it better next time). We also can perform actions without thinking about them, as where the action is one we "already know how to do"
and therefore do "intuitively." It may seem anomalous to suppose one
can engage in cognitive action without thinking about it, but the "thinking about" to which we have reference here is thinking that is reflexive: it
is looking at oneself, or, more precisely, at what one has thought or done.
For some purposes, it may be useful to distinguish whether self-reflection is done to "guide ongoing" activity, or to "look back at completed"
activity. Thus, self-reflection "guides ongoing" activity when the self-reflection is woven into action-as, for example, reflecting about my swimming stroke while I perform it. A corresponding instance, then, of "looking at completed" activity, is reflecting about my swimming stroke while
viewing a film of myself swimming.
However, these two kinds of self-reflection are the same, in the following sense. Both are thinking in the present about one's actions and their
consequences, toward the end of guiding what one may wish to do or
think in the future. The point of this observation is that self-reflection is
to be understood both as a way of doing things and as a way of learning
to do things. Thus, while we will be referring throughout this section to
"self-reflective learning," it would be more accurate to talk about "selfreflective-learning-and-doing," since self-reflection is no less validly a
principle of acting than of learning. In both instances, the "skill of" 9
See, e.g., Kreiling, supra note 107, at 285.
Consistent with current thought, this Article uses a vocabulary that differentiates
knowledge (the "cognitive or intellective domain"), skill (the "performance domain"), and
attitude (the "affective or feeling domain"). See Kreiling, supra note 107, at 287 n.10 (glossing the basic taxonomy used by Benjamin Bloom and his colleagues). However, it is important to understand the limitations of those distinctions. Our thought and action always mix
all three. The "skill of" self-reflective learning refers also to knowledge in the sense of cognitive understanding of self- reflection, and attitude in the sense of a valuing of self-reflective learning and recognition of its importance.
Education, generally, is conceived in terms of specific knowledge and competences to be
taught. What we chiefly seek as sophisticated educators, then, is more adequate definition
"o
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self-reflection signifies being intentionalabout (i.e., being aware-and-purposive in) one's conceptualization of experience.
As the idea is developed here, "intentionality in the conceptualization
of experience" incorporates concepts presented earlier in this Article. For
example, it was noted that "intentionality in conceptualization" is an idea
that integrates functions which the nomological tradition dichotomizes as
"discovering" what was already there and "creating" what was not. Thus,
in its aspect as discovering, the skill of intentionality in conceptualization
signifies achieving awareness of one's conceptualizations. In its aspect as
creating, it signifies achieving effective direction of one's conceptualizations.
1. Principles of Self-Reflective Learning
a. The teacher views learning from the perspective of an intentionally
conceptualizing student, for whom skills learning, whatever the subject
skill may be, means understanding the processes and products that comprise the work at which the skill aims.
b. To view skills learning from this perspective means to view it as the
learning of a language in terms of which students come to conceive and
direct the processes and products of their work.
c. Guiding students in such language development centers on fostering
the use of conceptual frameworks or strategies in the conceiving and
structuring of work.""
d. The student's immediate purpose in the use of frameworks and
strategies is to achieve competence in the tasks at hand. However, the
underlying purpose, paramount from the present perspective, is to develop the skill of intentionality in conceptualizing one's experience.

of the specific knowledge and competences it is our goal to impart, and more effective methodologies for imparting them.
While acknowledging the importance of that knowledge-and-competence-centered conception of education, what is being suggested here is the importance, also, of a learning-andinquiry-centered conception of education. This requires a shift, on the part of ourselves and
of our students, in what Gregory Bateson has called the "hierarchy of logical types." G.
BATESON, MIND AND NATURE: A NECESSARY UNITY 114 (1979). See id. at 121-24, describing
the difference between learning particular new behaviors and learning to learn new behaviors. This is an application of the broader point that our goal in self-reflective learning is to
normalize "thinking about thinking." See supra text accompanying note 81.
"I See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, LAWYERING PROCESS: CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN
ADVOCACY (1978); S. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL
PROCESS (1978). While efforts now are being made to develop such frameworks and strategies in relation to legal writing and legal reasoning (see, e.g., J. DERNBACH & B. SINGLETON, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING AND LEGAL METHOD (1981)), we are still at an early
stage in supporting self-reflective learning of cognitive process. See also COGNITIVE PROCESS
INSTRUCTION: RESEARCH ON TEACHING THINKING SKILLS 1-4 (J. Lochhead & J. Clement eds.
1979)(describing efforts to teach learning and problem-solving skills in fields of higher education other than law).
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e. Three kinds of conceptual systematicity are important in self-reflective learning. A major shortcoming of "pervasive" methods of instruction,
to which reference earlier was made,"' is that they tend to impede all
three.
1. Conceptual focus: Because we attend not to whole things but to
aspects of things, an important question always is to what aspects are we
attending, and with what degree of conceptual clarity. In foundational
learning of the skill of intentional conceptualization of experience, it is
important that teaching-learning situations permit explicit conceptual
focus."2
2. Conceptual continuity: The focus needs to be carried through time.
For example, in relation to the tasks in which one is instructed, there
should be coherence in the conceptual focus that occurs before the task,
13
during the task, and in feedback on performance following the task.1
3. Conceptual comprehensiveness: In understanding and organizing
complex work, one needs to go from wholes to parts; it is of the essence
that one learns to understand, generate, and apply frameworks and strategies not only in relation to bits of tasks, but in ways that integrate com4
plex whole tasks."
f. Self-reflective learning rests on a learning-centered conception of
knowledge whereby any explicit framework or strategy the student is
given is understood as a resource to be used in an open process of exploration and individuation." 5
g. Self-reflective learning requires understanding what it is to approach
learning within a broader context of self. This includes: 1) a sense of the
experiential and purposive roots of one's beliefs of fact and of value; 2) a
sense of what it is to surface, examine, and alter those beliefs; and 3) a
..
' See supra text accompanying notes 94, 96 and 100.
'1 By contrast, the models of serendipitous and intuitive learning that dominate our
thought about legal education (see in/ra note 126) leave it to the student to make sense of
his or her experience, on the belief that this is the way learning must occur. But see infra
note 115.
"s See, e.g., Gross, California Western Law School's First-Year Course in Legal Skills,
44 ALBANY L, REV. 369, 377 (1980) (illustrating conceptual continuity in a "three-step process
of concept formation").
...A weakness of the casebook method is that law students rarely engage in projects that
embody whole-task perspectives basic to legal work.
' One tends to think of the frameworks and strategies that guide work in terms such as
"check-lists" of steps to be followed, "tips" on effective work method, or as other similarly
explicit directive. This leads to questioning the intellectual worth of such instruction, or
withholding it for fear of "spoon-feeding" the student. The conception offered here emphasizes the aspect of frameworks and strategies as a "vocabulary" in terms of which to perceive and structure processes of work for oneself (see, e.g., P. ELBOw, WRITING WITHOUT
TEACHERS 12-75 (1973)(suggesting a vocabulary in which to understand the processes of
writing)), 'which one adapts to one's own cognitive structure. The idea is that conceptual
explicitness in instruction need not close or restrict learning and inquiry but, on the contrary, can open and facilitate it.
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sense of the basic processes by which one learns.1 1 6 Recognizing that, in
most contexts of higher education, explicit attention to such matters may
be practicable only to a limited degree, the broader aspiration is to create
an environment that awakens students to such dimensions of experience,
so that they may explore them on their own.
B.

Self-Reflective Learning Contrasted with Present Practice

For the lawyer and the law student, intentional conceptualization of
experience means intentionally conceiving and structuring law work. The
pattern of law school practice that is of concern, from this perspective, is
that the casebook method is not effective at teaching how to engage in
the intentional conceptualization of the processes and products of law
work. Several illustrations of this problem follow.
1. The casebook method tacitly represents that the case analysis and
synthesis it teaches are essentially the same as that done in law work
generally. In fact, however, the case analysis and synthesis done by lawyers in legal problem solving is vastly more complex then operations
learned in the casebook method.' 7 In most law schools, the only place in
the three-year law school program this latter universe of operations is dependably encountered by students is the traditional first year "research
and writing" course. Allocated relatively meager resources 1n and placed
in the already overfull first year program, this course barely scratches the
surface of the complex reasoning with legal materials that is basic to legal

"' See generally, C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS (1974). For a specific application, see in/ra notes 129-32 and accompanying
text.
17 See Gale, Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 ALBANY L. REV.
298, 311-17 (1980); Gross, California Western Law School's First-Year Course in Legal
Skills, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 369, 378 n.27 (1980)(identifying basic legal reasoning and writing
operations performed by lawyers, generally not treated in depth in the casebook method).
The casebook method culminates in examinations in which, typically, students apply legal
principles to a fact situation. These examinations differ markedly from the reasoning and
writing patterns of lawyer projects, in that the latter require 1) selecting and reasoning with
a universe of legal authorities (cases, statutes, etc), and 2) much greater care and depth in
the analysis and writing process. In essay examinations, students, working under great time
pressure, typically must move through a large number of issues, as the exam seeks to touch
most areas covered in the course.
First-year "research and writing" courses have been called, with reason, the "neglected
orphan" of the law school curriculum. See Actenberg, Legal Writing and Research: The
Neglected Orphan of the First Year, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 218 (1975). The courses generally
are taught by recent graduates on a one- or two-year appointment, or by tenure-track
faculty who take the assignment as a chore to be performed for as short a time as is politically feasible. This "revolving door" syndrome in staffing is a predictable consequence of the
conditions under which the teacher works: i.e., attempting to teach an extraordinarily wide
range of skills to too many students (whose principal concern, in any event, is performance
in their substantive courses), in too short a time.
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problem solving. 1 ' The present point is not that we fail to teach those
operations effectively, though that is troublesome enough. The point is
that this omission undermines development of the skill of intentionality
in the conceptualization of law work, by teaching that conceptually systematic study of the more complex operations is unfeasible or
unimportant.
2. Concepts such as "issue," "rule," and "holding" that are central to
case law study are artifacts of the casebook method. 120 Yet, the casebook
method generally hypostatizes them as objective features of the cases
themselves. 2 ' This misleadingly universalizes casebook processes, suggesting that case analysis in law work generally turns on rendering cases
in terms of the analytic constructs used in the casebook method. At a
more basic level, thus presenting analytic constructs as a property of the

9 By the end of the research and writing course, students typically will have learned the
rudiments of using a law library, written a half-dozen expository and persuasive legal work
products, and presented an oral appellate argument.
"I The point in the text above this footnote is well demonstrated in Julius Stone's classic,
Stone The Ratio of a Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597 (1959)(rebutting Arthur Goodhart's assertion that one can identify the rule or holding ("ratio decidendi") of a case,
(Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930)). Stone
shows the enormous range of propositions for which a case can stand, including, crucially,
variation in the generality with which the ratio is couched. Stone, supra at 603-04.
A central focus of law students in the casebook method is abstracting from each case one
or more propositions for which the case is taken to stand. See, e.g., B. SIEGEL, HOW TO
SUCCEED IN LAW SCHOOL 1-74 (1975); Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43
COLUM L. REV. 449, 452 (1943)(basic "trick of the trade," generally learned by the second
year, consists in reducing cases to something approximating "Restatement blackletter"
rules).
There is nothing wrong with students doing this, and such abstraction of a rule or holding
is an important aspect of legal reasoning. But it is one small piece of a much larger context
in which cases are to be understood chiefly as a plastic resource whose meaning emerges
when they are read as a group and in relation to a specific problem situation. The point is
that students will come to understand this, in conceptually and operationally adequate
terms, only by working with the plasticity to which Julius Stone refers, repeatedly and intensively in lawyering projects throughout their three years. See also supra note 117 (observing that law school examinations entail reasoning with abstracted rules, rather than with
the authority itself).
The "issue" of a case generally is taken to be the rule or holding couched in question
form. This redundancy presumably is what led Karl Llewellyn to omit "issue" in the case
briefing elements he proposed. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 54-55. As is reflected in
general usage, "holding" is the narrowest possible statement of what the court decided.
While "rule," "holding," and "issue" are used with great variability from one professor to
another, all seem to project the assumption that their understanding of each term is selfevident and self-evidently correct. The point is not that we "ought" to have a uniform understanding of these terms. The point is that we ought to make continuing discussion of all
these questions more central to law study.
"'. See supra note 120. Especially in the first-year of law study, which is when students'
basic conceptions of legal authority and work with the law are formed, an underlying premise of case class discussion is that the student is striving to state correctly the issue, rule,
and/or holding of the given case.
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cases undermines student learning of the principle, crucial to intentionality in the conceptualization of cognitive experience, that analysis of cases,
as of anything, is a function of one's tasks and purposes.
The consequence of this absence of functional contextualization of law
study constructs can be illustrated with the term "issue." "Issues" can
have a clear ("nonarguable") answer or, per contra, can have no clear
answer (i.e., be "arguable"). This differentiation ought to be presented as
basic to understanding the character of any given instance of "issue analysis," and be recognized as a function of the context in which the issue
analysis is being done.122 Instead, the very idea of the distinction is systematically obscured.12 3
Due to these, and a multitude of comparable causes, law students fail
to acquire an adequate idea of what it is to conceptualize the processes
and products of legal work. 24 Worse, the idea they do acquire is that

122 One of the most basic things lawyers learn is to identify propositions of law they can
accept as so. In the planning context, this takes the form of seeking to build one's client's
contractual or other arrangements on the "safe bedrock" of established law. Llewellyn, The
Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM L. REV. 345, 361 (1945)(emphasis in original).
In the litigation context, this takes the form of deciding what propositions to treat as
nonarguable in constructing one's reasoned position for the court. See infra note 123.
"I In law school, to discuss an "issue" is to discuss a point of application of law to fact,
without particular regard for whether the application is arguable. The conventional understanding of law school examinations is that the "issues" one discusses all are arguable. However, if one reads law school examination answers with this dimension in mind (see, e.g., S_
KINYON,

INTRODUCTION

TO LAW STUDY

AND

LAW EXAMINATIONS

IN A NUTSHELL 131-368

(1971)), one sees that most of the legal reasoning in which the student is engaged consists in
analyzing the factual situation into the legal terms and frameworks within which, then, the
arguable points are addressed.
Lack of conceptual clarity on this distinction is basic to the Socratic case class, which
reflects in turn, a comparable confusion in the Socratic dialogues themselves. Thus, Socrates
(i.e., Plato) presents the dialogues as a process of inquiry in which the participants, led by
Socrates, work together to root out error. In fact, however, the dialogues are a process by
which Socrates imposes his definitions and frameworks in a dialectic of demonstrative reasoning. E. HAVELOCK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS 209-15 (1957)(Socratic dia-

logue as a fundamental subversion of the open dialogue that had characterized sophistic and
that is characterized by deliberative intentionality. See infra text accompanying notes 12930). The resulting confusion is the one earlier remarked as basic to the nomological tradition
(see supra text following note 50), between reasoning as demonstration and reasoning as
inquiry.
In the Socratic case class in law school, students find themselves, for much of the time,
attempting to fathom the definitions and frameworks assumed by the professor in his/her
Socratic dialogue with the class. It is not common in Socratic classes, in the first-year at
least, to posit and systematically address issues as arguable. For this effectively to occur, the
participants must: stipulate together that the issue will be treated as arguable; work together to identify parameters of permissible and/or effective argument; and explore together
patterns of argumentation that ensue. To the extent one is concerned with reaching a conclusion (as a case class may not be, but a judge is) that then becomes the final step in an
explicit, systematic joint process of "inquiry".
124 The underlying problem is that students' "law work" (i.e., law study), in which they
form their basic conceptions of what it is to work with the law, occurs essentially outside the
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their relatively unreflective modes of conceptualizing law work are the
standard of intellectual accomplishment to which we in the law aspire.
This idea, established in the first year of law school, becomes ingrained
during the second and third years as the students' relation to their law
work becomes progressively less effort-full and less conceptually intentional. 1 5 Underlying this all, finally, is the problem that the models and
metaphors that dominate our thought about legal education are, precisely, ones of serendipitous and nonintentional ("intuitive") modes of
functioning. 2 '

ken of the instructional process. Law schools do not instruct students in this law work on
the belief (a) that its processes are too mundane to warrant such instruction and too idiosyncratic for such instruction to be feasible, and (b) that the essence of the learning process
is for students to figure this out on their own. Law faculty thus cede instruction in the
students' basic processes of law work to an informal law student culture and commercial
publications of various kinds.
The notion that it is inappropriate, unfeasible, or unimportant for us to guide students in
these processes is a shortcoming basic to the traditional system of legal education. Thus, we
simply have no terms in which to understand what it might be to help students conceptualize, as an example, the process of rendering course material into a coherent structure (a
project central to law study that students call "course outlining", and on which law faculty
generally give little guidance). Even further removed from our traditions is the notion that
the main reason to guide students in this project would not be to help them better understand the material (though it would do that), but to help them better understand what it
means to "understand" the processes and content of law. See also supra note 115 and accompanying text. One difficulty, I believe, is that were we to confront more clearly what
students in fact learn to do in law study, we also would confront all the things they learn to
do badly, or do not learn to do at all.
12

See supra note 85.

The traditional conception of legal education is rendered by the poem from which
Karl Llewellyn's classic THE BRAMBLE BuSH (1951) took its name:
There was a man in our town
and he was wondrous wise:
he jumped into a Bramble Bush
and scratched out both his eyes and when he saw that he was blind,
with all his might and main
he jumped into another one
and scratched them in again.
Id. at frontspiece. This poem presents the processes by which the student is reborn able to
"think like a lawyer" as something that happens to students, rather than as something they
understandingly do for themselves. Cf. Strong, The Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty,
25 J LEGAL EDUC. 226, 226 (1973)("The teacher's function is a species of psychic osmosis
whereby learning is induced in the student.")
Analogous conceptions are expressed today in the scientific determinisms of personality
psychology and the psychology of learning. See, e.g., Kelso, The 1981 AALS Conference on
Teaching Contracts: A Summary and Appraisal,32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 616, 634-35 (1982)(likening effective Socratic case class teaching to "programmed instruction" that turns on a well
structured process of positively reinforcing desired behavior); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: PsychologicalAspects of Legal Education, 37 CIN. L. REV. 93, 145-46
(1968) (stressing the role of positive reinforcement).
The passivizing influence of traditional modes of legal education has been criticized in a
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The idea of self-reflective learning is offered here less as a programmatic solution to all these problems than as an example of the kind of
intentionally-conceived vocabulary of intellective interiority which ought
to be central to our understanding and teaching of "thinking" skills. Let
us consider several vehicles by which self-reflective learning might be
taught and learned in the law school setting.
C.

Vehicles of Self-Reflective Learning
1.

Writing

The word "write" has two meanings. As a concrete activity, it means
putting one's thoughts into words and then putting those words onto paper. We have this meaning in mind when we call writing a "communication skill." In a second and much broader sense, however, "write" refers
to all one does in a project that culminates in a written product (as in, "I
have to write a paper for this course.").
The first sense, the concrete activity sense, of "writing" so dominates
our thought that this second sense must be understood as a synecdoche (a
figure of speech in which part stands for whole). The collapsed perception
embodied in this synecdoche betrays our relative blindness to the
processes that comprise the writing project. That blindness is manifest in
the extent to which instruction in "writing" focuses on the written product (its "substance" and "style"), rather than on the processes by which it
was produced.
In higher education, it is coming to be understood that writing projects
are intellect at work and that helping students see and direct those
2 7
processes is central to development of their intellective competence.'

political dimension. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 591, 594 (1982)("double surrender: to a passivizing classroom experience and to a passive attitude toward the content of the legal system"); TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW: 1971 43 (1971)(Report of the Curriculum Study Project
Committee to the Association of American Law Schools)("It has long been somewhat paradoxical that law teachers have proclaimed democratic values from autocratic roles"). Also, it
has been criticized in a psychological dimension. See, e.g., id. ("traditional relation between
law students and teachers . . . has tended to reinforce . . . aggressive, authoritarian, and
dependent traits"); I. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 162
(1977)(dependence of law students faulted for producing "arrogance, combativeness, nar-

rowness, and, deep within perhaps, some suppressed self-revulsion and self-doubt"). The
more serious casualty may be self-aware, self-directed functioning understood not merely as
a political or psychological, but as an intellectual value.
'2 While for law schools, the relevant literature includes, of course, works that treat the
processes of legal reasoning and research that accompany legal writing (see, e.g., works listed

supra note 110), more basic resources explicate the complex intellectual processes that
culminate in well-organized written work. See, e.g., P. ELBOW, WRITING WITHOUT TEACHERS
(1973); L FLOWER, PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES IN WRITING (1981); L. FLOWER & J. HAYES,
A PROCESS MODEL OF COMPOSITION (1979)(unpublished Report prepared under contract with
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The chief obstacle to development of such teaching and learning lies not
in the ineffability of the processes, but in our failure to understand the
importance of this dimension of intellectual development and to allocate
to it the resources itdeserves.
From the perspective of this Article, the importance of such teaching
and learning is magnified further by the fact that writing projects are a
principal vehicle through which to build patterns of conceptual selfawareness that can generalize, then, to other kinds of purposive activity.
2.

Collaborative Learning

To the limited extent it is used as an educational device, collaborative
work generally is viewed as (a) a medium of peer learning in which students expand their understanding through interchange with other students; and (b) an occasion for practicing interpersonal and communication skills entailed in cooperation. From our present perspective, however,
what is important is that collaborative work can be used to foster development of the skill of self-reflective learning.
In collaborative work, one has occasion to conceptualize aspects of process and product that otherwise are dimly perceived, if perceived at all.
Interactive conceptualization is especially important because language,
language-learning, and the thought processes they embody, are, in deepest senses, social phenomena: our ways of thought are developed,
paradigmatically, through interaction with others. 2 8 Hence, an important
benefit of collaborative work is that one can develop-through-use the vocabulary one subsequently will use, on one's own, in conceptualizing the
processes and products of one's work.
The educational benefits of collaborative work are, of course, increased
by a context in which the work is understood as an occasion for learning.
This suggests a second educative value of collaborative work-that it can
foster development of learning-centered modes of interaction.
Characterized by what we can call "deliberative intentionality,""" these

the National Institute of Education); E. MAIMON, WRITING IN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES (1981);
A. SCHOENFELD, Can Heuristics Be Taught?, in COGNITIVE PROCESS INSTRUCTION 315-36 (J.
Lochhead & J. Clement eds. 1979); M. SCRIVEN, REASONING (1976); M. SHAUGIHNESSY, ERRORS
AND EXPECTATIONS, 226-74 (1977); Sommers, Revision Strategies of Student-Writers and
Experienced Adult Writers, 31 C. Composition & Com. 378 (1980).
"' See, e.g., S. HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 144 (1959); HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,

supra note 8, at 36-37.
,' This signifies a shared understanding between participants in dialogue that they are
open to being changed by the dialogue. Having theoretic roots in non-nomological conceptions of reasoning, (see, e.g., D. Linge, Preface to H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS xx (1976); Hardwig, The Achievement of Moral Rationality, 6 PHIL. & RHET. 171, 18183 (1973)), this entails awareness of the limitations of a conception of dialogue in which the
dialogue situation is fixed in terms of "your position," "my position," and the nomological

structures on which our respective positions depend.
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are modes in which one is willing to disclose one's conceptions and beliefs; is open to having those conceptions and beliefs changed; and is willing to "confront" the other in a spirit of mutuality.13 0 Such modes of open
dialogue are functional in a variety of ways. Relatively unfamiliar in contemporary Western culture,'' they comprise a neglected but important
dimension of professional competence in law as well as in other
professions.'
The point of present relevance is that this open dialogue is a principal
resource for self-reflective learning outside the setting of formal education. 33 In developing, through collaborative work, the student's ability
and willingness"3 4 to engage in such dialogue, one contributes significantly
to the development of the skill of self-reflective learning.
As noted above with respect to writing, more attention now is being
paid, in higher education, to the use of collaborative work as an educational device. 3 5 Here too, the issue increasingly shifts from whether it is
feasible to include such dimensions in our teaching, to whether we understand and accept their importance.
3.

Observational Learning

To the limited extent it is now used as an educational device, the utility of observational learning is taken to be that one observes, in order to
emulate, people proficient in a skill one is seeking to learn. From the perspective of self-reflective learning, however, observational learning is an
occasion to practice conceptualizing the processes and products that embody the skill one is seeking to learn.
For this purpose, it is essential that observational learning be structured so as to accommodate principles of self-reflective learning such as
those set out above. Thus, for example, students have much to gain by
evaluating other students' written work, if, as the present perspective em-

-"

See W. TORBERT, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: TOWARD CONSCIOUSNESS 160-61, 165

(1972).
Id. at 12, 18-19.
"'
Id. at 5-17. See generally C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING
PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1974).
"I Working in the tradition of a therapy-centered conception of learning, W. TORBERT
and C. ARGYRIS & B. SCHON, supra note 116, focus on specially constructed "trainer"-led
processes. See W. ToRBERT, supra note 130, at 165-66, 171-72 ("educators" and "trainers");
C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 116, at 96, 97-109 ("instructors"). While they advert to
the question of how such processes are pursued on one's own (see, e.g., W. TORBERT, supra
note 130 at 158-63), that is not their principal focus.
" At the risk of repeating the point excessively (see supra note 109) the article intends,
throughout, a compound of what we generally differentiate as knowledge, skill, and attitude.
15 See, e.g.,

BRUFFEE,

The Brooklyn Plan: Attaining Intellectual Growth Through Peer-

Group Tutoring, in 64 LIBERAL Enuc. 447-68 (1978). Kenneth Bruffee has helped at least
two law schools incorporate principles of collaborative work in their first-year legal writing
courses.
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phasizes, this is done in ways that foster development of a conceptual
language useful in seeing and directing their own work." 6
Findings in the field of teacher education suggest that the effectiveness
of observational learning (specifically, trainee observation of teachers at
work in the classroom) may be greater where the observational experience
is structured as a vehicle for concept formation. 137 This, in turn, suggests
the utility of observational learning in other kinds of professional education, for example in clinical internships, if adequate provision is made to
support conceptual learning dimensions.
In some respects, it is easier to observe others than to observe oneself.
This often may be so, for example, with respect to patterns of work that
are deeply ingrained or those about which one feels defensive. In many
contexts, therefore, intentionally conceptualizing the behavior of others
may serve as an easier "first step" in learning to observe oneself.
4. Future-Directed Learning
Thus far we have considered instruction in self-reflective learning in
terms of student practice of that skill. It is also useful, however, to consider instruction in which students (a) "think forward" to the work situations for which they are preparing and, with that context in mind, (b)
deliberately acquire resources and expectations that will support self-reflective learning in those situations. Two examples follow:
a. Given an aim to support self-reflective learning after graduation, one
might attach particular importance to dependable student learning of the
following, as categories of "subject matter coverage," within an area of
doctrinal law:
1. "Landmark" units of current legislative and decisional law; principal resources and strategies for doctrinal research/analysis in the area;
2. Thematic structure of main principles and purposes of law and institutional arrangement;
3. Principal or characteristic areas of change or uncertainty, and their
source in policy or doctrinal conflict;
4. Principal or characteristic questions of strategy that arise in planning, and conflict resolution, in the area.
The intellective utility of such instruction, it must be emphasized, derives from thematic coherence in its presentation and assimilation, and
recognition that particulars now imparted are less important (since they
will change) than understanding what it is to conceptualize a field of doctrine in ways functional for legal problem solving.

116This requires the sort of conceptual coherence in writing instruction that is referred to
supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
I" See D. Gliessman, The Concept Acquisition Model in the Development of Teaching
Skills (April 1979)(unpublished paper presented to American Educational Research Association, San Francisco).
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b. While courses in applied skill now focus on teaching the skill itself, a
"future-directed" perspective suggests the importance of attending to
learning the skill after graduation. Such attention can take the form of:
developing a conceptual vocabulary of process and product in which selflearning later can take place; making the idea of subsequent self-learning
as tangible and as valued as possible; and suggesting practical strategies
for use in self-learning of the skill.
Related to this is the use of clinical internships not merely for learning
specific knowledge or skills encountered in the internship, but also for
learning how to learn in the work environment. 1 Here too, the essential
thing is that students understand the internship as an academically supported introduction to later learning.
The future-directed perspective suggests, finally, that we should establish as a minimum of applied skills training received by all students in all
major applied skill areas, instruction whose goal is to impart an understanding of the nature and importance of the skill, and strategies for selflearning in the skill. At present, the case is that many students who do
not take a course in a given applied skill graduate with dim awareness
that there is such a skill, let alone what it would be to study it on one's
own.
VII.

THE PROBLEM OF CHOICE AND COHERENCE: THEORETIC DIALOGUE IN
THE LEGAL EDUCATION COMMUNITY

Section V began with the question, "In what terms are we to conceive

the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that comprise the goals of a coherent
program of general legal education?" The preceding section suggested the
theory and the program of "self-reflective learning" as one, partial re-

sponse. But the problem to which we now turn is that this-or any
1"8See generally Kreiling, supra note 107. Specifically, from the present perspective, the
goal is to learn to engage in self-reflective learning under conditions of the work situation.
Crucial conditions of lawyering are the transaction cost of lawyer work, and the tactical
context in which problems are presented. McCauley, supra note 95, at 514. See also C.
ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 116, at 4 (importance of learning under real-life conditions); id. at 3-19, 157 (action-oriented character of theory).
An issue this raises for the law schools is how to pursue intellectual ideals associated with
the academic enterprise embodied in patterns of thought McCauley denigrates as
"think[ing] like law professors" (McCauley, supra note 95, at 514 (emphasis in original)),
and also face up to the question how those intellectual ideals will enter the professional lives
of our students. At times we seem more interested in asserting the difference and superiority of academic modes of thought, (see Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against
Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637, 638 (1968)(positing the role of "Hessian-trainer" for ourselves
and, thereby, positing the role of Hessian for our students)), than in considering how such
modes are to enter the professional lives of our students. The dominant response at present
seems to be to think of our students as possessing a "double-identity," differentiating their
identity as "lawyer" from their identity as "mind." See White, The Study of Law as an
Intellectual Activity, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 10 (1982).
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other-response to the problem of "coherence" in legal education requires a bind of dialogue within the legal education community that presently seems lacking. This section addresses that problem with the following two-part thesis:
a. Critique: We have not made adequate use of theoretic dialogue in
the legal education community; this is due in part to nomological conceptions of what theory and theory development are.
b. Proposal: We can benefit correspondingly by attending to post-nomological conceptions of theory and of theory development.
A.

Critique

Several factors combine to impede coherent theoretic dialogue in the
legal education community.
1. Disassociation of Theory From the Role of Teacher
By and large, we do not feel that it is necessary to have well-developed
theories about what we do as teachers. This is attributable to the nomological tradition in the following respect. Theory is associated with academic study in distinction to practical, actional dimensions we enter as
teachers. Theorizing about education is seen as more properly the province of education professors because their scholarship is in that field.
This may be contrasted with conceptions of theory developed in this
Article, which seek congruence between theory and action."'9 Thus, as the
term is used here, "theory" is simply a conceptually coherent account of
what one is doing. For teachers, in this view, theory about education
means conceptions of goal and method that permit one to plan, discuss,
and reflect upon one's experience as a teacher. Thus, in referring to dialogue as "theoretic," I simply mean dialogue in or about theory, without
the common connotation of moot or divorced from application.
2.

Against Conceptual Coherence in the Legal Education Program:
The Ideology of Lone Rangerism

Some commentators have attributed the lack of coherence in the law
school program to the ethos of "long rangerism," that is, to beliefs and
practices that stress the independent functioning of each member of the
faculty.'4" Insofar as our problems stem from a lack of coherence, the

' Whereas the nomological tradition understands "theory" in terms suggested by its etymological relation to "spectator" and "theatre", (see E. KLEIN, 2 A COMPREHENSIVE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1603 (1967); MIRROR, supra note 8, at 11
(continued domination by Platonic "ocular metaphors")), the present perspective emphasizes theory as beliefs of fact and value that are integral to our thought and action in the

world. Id. See also C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 116, at 3-19.
"I See, e.g., Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J.
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commentators conclude, "the enemy is us."''
Lone rangerism is not
merely a self-serving refusal to accept the discipline necessary for coherent community. Lone rangerism is a deeply grounded ideology of academic intellect. The main tenet of this ideology is that the genius of the
academy is the genius of the individuals who comprise it. Consistent with
this tenet is that there ought to be as many different visions of education
as there are law professors. This is the ideological predicate for the lone
ranger view of the law school curriculum, in which (a) the important
thing is not what subjects students take, but that students be exposed to
a variety of competent modes of addressing the world of law; and (b) to
the extent we must attend to subject matter coverage, our obligation is to
provide the needed basic courses and to offer a variety of courses from
which students can choose according to their interests.
From the perspective of this ideology, the only "coherence" needed in
the law school program is a coherence we now have in abundance. It consists of standards of faculty retention that assure each teacher's competence (a) in the modes of instruction we use to teach substance and skills
through doctrine-specific courses, and (b) in whatever substantive field(s)
comprise the teacher's scholarly expertise. To the extent change is desired, this perspective concludes, the road to reform lies through experimentation in the individual classroom. 42 Thus, the ideology of lone

327 (1982); Michelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean CurricularGeometry, 32
J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 355 (1982).
"' Cf. Gorman, Legal Education at the End of the Century: An Introduction, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 319 (1982); Cramton, supra note 140, at 333.
"' Over the past several years there has been a marked increase in the number of severalday "workshops" sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools that bring together
teachers to exchange ideas and, in some instances, to engage in practice-teaching and critique with respect to instruction in a particular subject area. See, eg-, Strauss, supra note
87; Kelso, supra note 126. While these workshops are a source of valuable support for the
individual teacher, they tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, the prevailing conception
of legal education described in Section V: doctrinal instruction accompanied by pervasive
attention to applied skills and to intellectual breadth and depth.
More collegially-minded law teachers advocate "small-group faculty experimentation."
See, e.g., Gorman, Legal Education at the End of the Century: An Introduction, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 315, 319 (1982). An example of a vehicle for small-group work is the "major sequential program" concept proposed by a faculty committee at the Harvard Law School.
See, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, Order and Progression in the Upper-Level Curriculum (Tent. Final Draft, April
23, 1982)(hereinafter cited as MICHELMAN REPORT, after Prof. Frank I. Michelman). In this
program, a "limited number" of second and third year students would take up to one-half
their total second and third year credits in field-specific study consisting of "an ordered
cluster of courses, seminars, and other activities such as self-study units, student tutorials,
practice projects and field placements." Id. at 1, 4. While the proposal has much to recommend it, its potential benefits appear limited by the fact that (a) it reaches only some students, and (b) its relatively labor-intensive character may make it a difficult reform for less
wealthy schools to adopt. At a more basic level, predicated as it is on the model of creating
"'schools' within the school" (id. at 12), the proposal in some measure simply moves to
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rangerism finds sufficient coherence in the status quo and has little interest in the proposition that increased programmatic and conceptual coherence may be feasible or desirable.
3. Neglect of Theory in Important Projects of Self-Study by the Legal
Education Community
a.

The Carrington Report

Published in 1972, the Carrington Report reflects a major effort by the
legal education community to rethink the three-year general law degree
program. 4 3 Rather than present a thematic assessment of issues and options facing us, the Committee formulated a "Model Course Announcement," setting forth a concrete program of legal education."'
While stimulating and enlightening, this method of reporting the Committee's work failed to guide a thematically-informed discussion of the
goals and methods of general legal education. 1" The legal education community focused instead on a dramatic structural aspect of the "proposed"
curriculum, whereby the general degree program would be reduced from
three years to two, with an optional third year devoted to specialized legal
study. The major finding of the study was taken to be not how the general degree program could be improved, but that the general 1degree
pro46
gram should be reduced in favor of specialized legal training.

another level the fundamental issues of conception and of faculty interest described in Section V.
'"

REPORT BY THE CURRICULUM

STUDY PROJECT COMMITTEE TO THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERI-

1971 (1971)(published as Pt. One, Sec. II, of the Proceedings of the Association of American Law Schools,
1971 Annual Meeting)(hereinafter cited as CARRINGTON REPORT, after Paul D. Carrington,
Director). The Committee had 14 members. The Report acknowledges principal assistance
by 19 other individuals (id. at second title page) and expresses gratitude for the contributions of an additional 93. Id. at i-iii.
' Id. at 4-33 (ch. 2). See also infro note 145. The Report has four Appendices. Appendix
I (68 pages) is a heavily edited version of A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF
THE LAW (1921)(hereinafter cited as REED REPORT), a classic study of American legal education to which the CARRINGTON REPORT presents itself as a kind of sequel. CARRINGTON REPORT, supro note 140, at v. Appendix 11(42 pages) is a "contemporary review" of the REED
REPORT. See infra note 145. Appendix III (55 pages) is an edited version of two articles by
Brainerd Currie (1951, 1955) on the materials of law study. Appendix IV (9 pages) is a
contemporary comment on Appendix III, chiefly on Currie's theme that more social science
instruction is needed in the law schools.
"I In Chapter 3, CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 143, at 34-73, the Committee sets out
its rationale for the "Model" curriculum. However, the 17 pages of this Chapter devoted to
the general degree program, id. at 34-50, are so generalized, or focused on particulars of the
Model, as to be of very limited use in supporting broad based reconsideration of generalist
legal education.
"I See, e.g., Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L.REV. 221, 229 (1974)(first full paragraph). The REED REPORT,supra
CAN LAW SCHOOLS, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW:
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Seventeen months after the report's release, the American Bar Association, the chief accrediting agency for American law schools, entertained a
proposal that its accreditation requirement be reduced from three years
to two to accommodate programs such as that espoused in the Carrington
Report. 1 7 The underlying issues were: What are the goals of the general
degree program? and, Can the two-year program dependably achieve
them? The report did not explicitly state and address those issues in
terms tied concretely to the law school world; nor does it appear that
proponents conceived or presented their case to the 4American Bar Associ48
ation in such terms. The proposal was defeated.1 1
Doubtless, there are many reasons the committee chose a strategy of
exemplification rather than of thematic development in drafting its report. But it seems relevant in this regard that the Director's preface to
the report begins with these words: "American legal education, like most,
is a mindless growth . .

.

.This is the way that such institutions should

grow; not from a single arrogant concept, but as a flourishing of many
individual wisdoms."'' 50 The perception, perhaps, was that to develop a
coherent theoretic would have been, by definition, to espouse a "single
arrogant concept," whereas the model curriculum, by its very nature, was
simply a vehicle for discussion.'
Identification of coherent theory with "single arrogant concept" follows
all too easily from a conception of theory as fixed nomological structure.
This view of theory leads, in turn, to the understanding that we must

note 144, was titled Training for the Public Profession of the Law, and the Carrington
Committee pointedly titled its report, Training for the Public Professions of the Law (emphasis added). See also infra note 148.
117See Stolz, The Two-Year School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J_ LEGAL Enuc. 37
(1973).
148 Professor Preble Stolz was cast as the Report's principal theoretician in the sense that
it was he who wrote Appendix II, a "Contemporary Review" of the REED REPORT. See supra
note 144. Professor Stolz's review chiefly: (a) criticizes our traditional emphasis on the lawyer as a generalist (CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 143, at 165-75 ("the fiction of a unitary
bar [has been] one of the law's least constructive flights into fantasy," id. at 174; "image of
omnicompetence," id.)); and (b) questions the need for a general degree program of three
years duration. Id. at 176-78.
Professor Stolz's subsequent account of the American Bar Association's consideration of
the proposal (Stolz, supra note 147) also presents the central point as being the limitations
of generalist legal education. Thus, the thrust of his "advocate's view of the arguments
presented against the proposal," (id. at 40), is this: he first cites Dean Abraham Goldstein's
statement that "at the time when law is perhaps more complex than ever before, and occupying more areas of our economic and social life, [it
seems curious that] we would acquiesce
in the notion that lawyers can be trained in two-thirds the time" (id. at 45). He then responds, "No one who has studied the legal profession thinks that all or any lawyers are
omnicompetent generalists. The bar is specialized and getting more so, and, given that reality, no one could suppose that all lawyers should be trained in the same way." Id.
149 Id. at 40.
"'
CARRINGTON REPORT,
l

supra note 143, at iv.
See id. (third paragraph).
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choose between "single arrogant concept" and "mindless growth." However, as argued later in this Article, theoretic dialogue is an important
third mode of community intelligence."5 2
b.

The Foulis Report

The Foulis Report is the product of an eight-year study of American
legal education conducted under the aegis of the American Bar Association. 153 The report is a paradigm of the ideology and rhetoric of scientific
5 4
However, it also stands as a reminder that empirical reempiricism."
search alone cannot provide the guidance a community needs when addressing complex issues of goal and method.'
- In light of the passage quoted above (see supra text accompanying note 150), the fate
of the Report makes its miscommunication ironically complete. Thus, rejection by the
American Bar Association, and lack of subsequent attention by the legal education community (see Gorman, Legal Education at the End of a Century: An Introduction, 32 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 315, 317 (1982)("little discernible impact")), have been absorbed into the culture of
American legal education as the lesson that "idiramatic proposals for restructuring legal
education" are not well received by the law schools or the bar, (supra note 146, at 229), and
that it "seems likely that reform and innovation in established institutions like the law
schools will be a gradual and incremental process, reflecting the net results of innumerable
individual decisions by legal educators and administrators rather than dramatic restructuring." Id. at 234.
153 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
UCATION

OF THE AMERICAN

OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL

ED-

BAR ASSOCIATION: LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

(1980)(Foulis Report after Ronald J. Foulis, Chairman).

' The bulk of the Report is a review of studies of legal education that employ social
science methodology. The premise throughout is that "empirical findings" will "suggest"
how to resolve, or will "serve as the foundation for," or "help to form the predicate for"
resolving, the basic issues that confront us. FoULIs REPORT, supra note 153 at 2, 25. See also
infra notes 155-56.

"' Gathering and statistically analyzing data is the easy part. The hard part is interpreting the data, and applying the data, and our interpretations of them, in action. This point is
simple, but is inadequately reflected in the Foulis Report. Manifestations of a gap, in the
Report, between the realm of data gathering on the one hand, and of data interpretation
and application on the other, include the following:

1. The quality of advocacy in the courts was one of the main issues that precipitated the
FoULLs REPORT. Id. at 10-13. The Report's principal data on this issue indicated that: (a)
there was not a dramatic problem with respect to lawyer competence (id. at 63-67 (e-g., (i)
87, of trial lawyers were deemed at least minimally competent, id. at 64; (ii) "'on the
whole, the ratings present a very favorable picture of the quality of [trial] advocacy in the
district court's [citation omitted]," id. at 65 and (iii) the quality of appellate advocacy generally was rated higher than trial advocacy, id. at 67)); and (b) lawyers who reported they
had not had a law school course in trial advocacy generally performed better than those who
had. Id. at 67. Beyond observing that the latter fact "may be due to some unidentified
factors" (id.), and that from a litigant's perspective, a "single inept performance" is too
much (id. at 68), the Report neither challenges, nor affirms, those conclusions. One is left,
therefore, with a nagging sense that, on this issue at least, ritualized reciting of data rather
overshadows the importance of interpretive and applicational reasoning with them.
2. The Report does not discuss how we are to define the minimum level of applied skills
competence students should have when they graduate. The Report recommends that the
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The latter point may seem trivial in its obviousness; it is made important, however, by the extent to which the nomological tradition leads our
community to channel its energies into objective empirical research 156
such as this, and correspondingly to neglect arts of community that are,
in many ways, more difficult.

American Bar Association advocate that law schools provide all students instruction "in
such fundamental skills as: oral communication, interviewing, counseling, and negotiation"
(id. at 103), but does not consider what it would entail, in terms of program or cost, for the
schools to do so. The Report also recommends that instruction in "litigation skills" be offered "to all students desiring it." Id. However, (a) the Report undermines this recommendation by observing that "[hiowever laudable the objective ... it will be difficult and expensive to implement" (id. at 69); and (b) the Report, by omitting this from the list of skills
all students are to learn, effectively concludes, without discussion, that no minimum introduction to litigation skills is needed by all our graduates-despite the fact that, as noted
above, competence in this skill was one of the chief concerns that gave rise to the Report.
Id. at 10-12.
3. Rather more than on the issue of applied skills instruction, the principal focus of the
Report's Conclusions (id. at 91-94), though not of its Recommendations to the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association (id. at 103-04), is on the following problem: because the pursuit of status and prestige looms so large in the legal profession (id. at 91-94),
the "'least qualified' " students from " 'lesser'" law schools "end up doing the relatively low
prestige work of the profession" -resulting in "the inequitable distribution of legal talent
(at least as talent is defined by the profession)." Id. at 94. The Report's development of this
theme reflects disjunction between data on the one hand, and their interpretation and application on the other, in several ways:
(a) The Report's use of quotation marks, and its parenthetical, in the excerpts quoted
immediately above, signify that the Report regarded the basic conceptions in terms of which
the issue is defined ("lesser," "least qualified," and "legal talent") as problematic. But the
Report nowhere addresses these basic ambiguities, so that the issue itself is left without
conceptual foundation.
(b) As important as this issue of "inequitable distribution" may be, i) it was not raised in
the thoroughgoing prospectus (Boyer & Cramton, supra note 146), on which the work of the
Committee was based (the "first order of business" of the Foulis Committee was to commission this "agenda" for its work, Report at vii); and ii) the Report does not consider the
issue's programmatic implications. The consequence is that one cannot see the Report's
treatment of this issue as part of a coherent course of community research, dialogue, and
action.
4. It may seem unfair to fault the Report for failing to do, or be, more than the data and
circumstances permitted. But the "more" one might have wanted here is greater explicit
recognition that data, interpretation, and action are an integral triad, in this, as in most
problems of community intelligence. In fundamental ways, this lack is attributable to the
scholarly ethos of scientific empiricism that makes it difficult for the academic, plying his
trade, to look beyond or behind objectivizing formulations of the type, "We have reason to
conclude that ... ;" "There seems to be solid evidence to support the conclusion that...;"
"The research we have reviewed reflects ... ;" and "We have evidence for concluding that
..Id. at 92-93. See also infra notes 156 and 181.
Ise This reflects an ideology that is deeply "entrenched in the social disciplines: the belief
that increased systematic empirical understanding . . .[will] virtually lead to the intelligent
formulation of policies." R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY xii (1976).
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4. Radical Critique of Legal Education and the Continued Ascendancy
of Nomological Thought
When a problem is deeply rooted, one looks to radical critique to bring
the sources of difficulty to light. However, the two major instances of radical critique of legal education in the present generation-while they have
benefited the community greatly-have not carried us beyond the nomological tradition.
a. Humanist Critique
In the 1960s humanist" 7 law teachers mounted a sustained attack on
the adversarial dialectic of the traditional case class, seeing in it a depersonalization of the student and of the professional role.' 8 This critique
was much needed and had a permanent reforming effect on American legal education. Of present relevance, however, is that the critique, and the
establishment's assimilation of it, not only failed to challenge, but helped
consolidate, the nomological tradition.
The humanist critique was structured by the duality of privatism and
the technological that, as we have seen, 59 is basic to the nomological tradition. The critique identified itself with privatism by asserting against
cognitive and instrumental conceptions of self, the importance of emotive,
valuing, private self.'60 The critique embraced as well the nomological
structures of the science of psychology,"" and the legal education community-both in defending against the attack and in assimilating what it
found valid in the attack-accepted that as the relevant conceptual vocabulary. ' 6' The psychological perspective now has grown into a basic definition of professional role whereby the function of lawyers is to care for

.. Recognizing there are those who legitimately resent such appropriation of the approbative "humanistic" to refer to a particular ideological viewpoint (see e.g., Gellhorn, 'Humanistic Perspective':A Critique, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 99, 100 (1982)), the text uses the term
to mean concern for the interest of self-actualization, and for the emotive, valuing, private

dimensions of our experience.
"'

See infra notes 160-61.

See supra text following note 74.
See, e.g-, Savoy, Toward a New Politicsof Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 452, 461
(1970)("hypertrophy of the intellect" [citation omitted]; "cutting off our hearts and living in
"'

our heads"); HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW: REASSESSING LAW SCHOOLING 21-26 (1980)(publication of Project for the Study and Application of Humanistic Education in Law). See also
infra note 164. See generally, J. HIMMELSTEIN, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
...See, e.g., 1. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE

(1977);

Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1968).
"' See, e.g., Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971); Boyer &
Cramton, supra note 146, at 258-70 (thoroughgoing ratification of Stone, supra, and of the
psychological perspective generally). See also infra note 164.
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the psychologically understood well-being of their clients. 6 3
These perspectives have enriched legal education. But, by emotivizing
perception of the student's situation and of the professional role, they
have left our conceptions
of intellect trapped in the duality of privatism
1 4
and the technological. 6
b. Radical Left Critique
Grounded in Marxism, the radical left perspective includes as well the
broad eclecticism of "Critical Legal Studies."' 5 While this critique has
challenged Western liberal thought in basic ways, its alternative visions
are nomological in that they aspire to self-sufficient thought systems that
describe end states toward which society should strive, or processes
through which society's destiny should unfold."' The theories this produces are of great interest, but have relatively little relation to concrete
projects in the world.
With respect to the law school program, radical left critique has chiefly
produced advocacy of (a) social science instruction that will equip stu-

,63See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV.
487, 496-525 (1980). See infra note 164.
"' As Simon, supra note 163, observes, the psychological vision persistently denigrates
the idea that intellectively understood principles are needed to mediate the exercise of
power by lawyers. See,e.g., id. at 493-94, 499-500, 502-03, 506-11, 524, 535-37.
The psychological perspective emphasizes the "affective at the expense of the cognitive"
(id. at 490), and its "reduction of the world to personal feeling, and therapeutic pedagogy
...reinforce[s] and legitimate[s] the instrumental self and its manipulative apparatus" (id.
at 550). This creates an environment in which: (a) the well-being of our students counts
more than the interests of the public we are preparing them to serve; (b) one is not surprised to see the sentence, "We use 'manipulation' here without intending a pejorative connotation," (I. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 85, at 211); and (c) the problem of student dependence and disempowerment in the law school regime is assessed not in terms of
student self-understanding and intellective autonomy, but in terms of how we can engender
in students a greater sense of self-esteem. See Boyer & Cramton, supra note 146, at 258-67,
275-81; Stone, supra note 162, at 427 ("The critical problem facing legal education is how to
mitigate the traditional syndrome of disengagement [in the second and third years of law
school] by devising educational techniques that help the student readjust his ego-ideal and
reinforce his sense of self-esteem.")
See also infra note 181.
"I See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Mouement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 563-64 n.1
(1983).
16 R. UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITCS (1975) (based on precepts of a "unitary human
nature" as "the final basis of moral judgment" (id. at 221), pursuit of a "doctrine of community" by which the "ideal of universal community" can be manifested, to the extent feasible,
in an actual social order, id. at 260-61). See Mirror, supra note 8, at 381-83 (noting that
Habermas commits the "primal error of systematic philosophy" in attempting to ground
thought in a priori, universal truths about the human condition). See also, J. BERNSTEIN,
THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 192, 206-08, 220 (1976)(based on
forms of inquiry and communication corresponding to identified cognitive interests,
Habermas' purusit of a "quasi-transcendental" philosophical system).
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dents to be informed critics
of the social order, 5 7 and (b) radical reform
s8
within the law schools

B. Proposal: Post-Nomological Theory and the Arts of Community
This Article argues that we need a more coherent conception of the
knowledge, skills and attitudes that are the goals of legal education. The
preceding critique has shown how nomological conceptions of theory and
of community impede theoretic dialogue that might help lead to such
coherence.
What response to this problem, then, does the post-nomological perspective suggest? Among conceptions presented in Section Six, in connection with self-reflective learning, is the ideal of "deliberative intentionality" and "open dialogue.""1 8 This, it was said, signifies dialogue in which
one is willing to disclose one's conceptions and beliefs; is open to having
those conceptions and beliefs changed; and is willing to "confront" the
other in a spirit of mutuality.""
Reflecting strategies of open, learning-centered interaction with others,
the ideal of deliberative intentionality and open dialogue assumes special
significance from the post-nomological perspective. This significance can
be elaborated, as follows, in relation to three important themes of postnomological thought.
1.

Emancipation vs. Consolidation

Where the nomological tradition values theory that will help elaborate
and consolidate prevailing knowledge structures, post-nomological theory
seeks to challenge and transform those structures.'
It therefore values
strategies of inquiry that conduce to critique and change. Such strategies-which include, for example, (a) the articulation of minority interpretation, (b) extension to the borders of absurdity, (c) the search for
antithesis, and (d) the search for alternative metaphors 2-are basic to

"I See, e.g., Klare, The Law School Curriculum in the 1980's: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 336, 343 (1982).

"I See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL.

EDJC. 591, 610-15 (1982).

1"9
See supra text at notes 129-32.
'10This is in contrast to a mode basic to (a) nomological science, see Torbert, supra note
130, at 64-65, and (b) contemporary professional education and practice, see Argyris &
Schon, supra note 116, at 139-52, in which one's aim is to persuade and control rather than
to undergo change oneself.
'
See, e.g., supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
"'
See TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 139-44, where these four strategies are
presented as part of a richly developed examination of contemporary sociobehavioral science-including examination of respects in which the nomological tradition has stultified
growth and change in the theories of that science. See id. at 111-39.
Gergen's basic questioning of the precepts of nomological sociobehaviorial science, see
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this Article's development of themes of post-nomological thought.
Moving beyond the nomological conception of theory and community,
emancipation emphasizes ideals of community process such as deliberative intentionality and open dialogue, that are suited to an enterprise of
critique and change.
2.

Incompleteness vs. Self-Sufficiency:

"Open" vs. "Closed" Theory

The nomological tradition yields a paradigm of knowledge as proposition structures from which conclusions of prediction, explanation and
control can be deductively derived. To permit prediction and control,
such structures must be self-sufficient, in the sense that they must encompass all the laws and facts that determine the phenomena addressed.
The corresponding post-nomological conception is of theory as incomplete. This principle of incompleteness holds that every knowledge structure is dependent on other, outside knowledge structures. Challenging the
precept of the nomological tradition that academic competence means
competence in the nomological structures of one's scholarly perspective,
the principle of incompleteness emphasizes that one should seek continually to contextualize and critique one's own theory in relation to other
theories.'73
This embraces the ideal of "open" as opposed to "closed," theory. Reflecting a growth-centered view of knowledge, the ideal of open theory
values theory more for the insights to which it may lead, then for its

supra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text, leads to "a new way of thinking about scientific activity," id. at 192, that stresses the creativity of the scientific enterprise, id. at 201-07,
and suggests the special importance-for science-of four broad strands of Western
thought: (a) "the hermeneutic-interpretive movement," (b) "dialectics," (c) "the critical perspective," and (d) "the ethogenic alternative." See id. at 192-200. See also supra note 14.
"I As applied to the theory of self-reflective learning presented in Section Six, for example, this leads one to recognize that, while focused on self-reflective learning as a valued set
of goals and methods, the theory of self-reflective learning needs to ground itself, too, in its
limitations. Thus, it is a major failing in the way C. ARGvYRs & D. SCHON, supra note 116,
have formulated their work on experiential learning that they (a) identify learning-oriented
modes (which they call "Model II" behavior, see id at 85-95), with competence and (b)
identify opposite modes of behavior (closed and controlling-"Model I," see id. at 63-83),
with lack of competence. In fact, both modes of behavior are competent, depending on the
setting. See Simon, supra note 163, at 533-37. The significance of this mistake is not merely
that it overstates the virtues of Model II modes of behavior and incorrectly dismisses Model
I. The larger point is that it misrepresents the basic issue facing people at work in the
world, which is the issue of choosing how to be. This is an example of the way psychological
doctrine tends to skirt issues of choice and power. See supra note 164 and infra note 181.
As an example from another field, what emerges from critiques of the law-and-economics
perspective (see, e.g., Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197 (1983)), is that a central weakness is its failure to see and develop itself in relation to (a) its own limitations, and
(b) other social science perspectives.
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promise to produce self-sufficient nomological structures. 7 "

The post-nomological perspective emphasizes, finally, that the condition of incompleteness, and the deep interdependence it imports, are essential, permanent features of theory-or, rather, of the living theories' 75
that are the ground of intellectual life.
3.

Moral Being vs. Technologism

As was earlier observed,' 7 "technologism," an ethos combining the ideals of nomological structure and privatism, now dominates the academy.
In technologism, we cling ever more tightly to the ideal of certainty"" and
permanence' 78 that underlies the nomological tradition. Thus, today the
radical left is justified by radical doctrine; the psychological perspective is
justified by psychological doctrine; and the rights jurisprudent is justified
by a doctrine of justice. For issues not thus doctrinally resolvable, all we
can do is raise questions.
In consequence, our relations in community increasingly are governed
by the "black-letter theory"'179 of nomological structure. As we thus become progressively more removed from what it is to be intellect-and-self
in the world outside the academy-or, indeed, in other disciplines within
the academy-coherence among our perspectives, as well as connectedness with the lives of our students, diminish as ideal and as reality. 80
What underlies our situation is this: the ethos of technologism denies
that we academics confront fundamental issues of value choice in our own
intellectual lives. For, it teaches that the function of the academy selfevidently is to teach and practice (a) competence in the knowledge and

See, e.g., S.

Sociology: Development of Sociological Thought, in 15 INTER23, 27-30 (1968)(contrasting "closedsystem" and "open-system" theories in sociological thought). What one is addressing here is
17

EISENSTADT,

NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

a matter of degree and not of absolutes. The issue is the extent to which one's conceptual
universe is "open," rather than whether it is open. For discussion of open theory in another
context, see W. TORBERT, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: TOWARD CONSCIOUSNESS 150-52
(1972)(describing the character and virtues of an open theory of experiential learning).
Karl Llewellyn begins his classic THE COMMON LAW TRADITION! DECIDING APPEALS (1960),
by describing fourteen "major steadying factors in our appellate courts." Id. at 19-51. Corresponding to the balance of the book, this presentation of factors is much too discursive to
serve as what anyone would call a "theory" of judicial decision. Yet, such a concatenation of
"factors," openly addressed, may have more value as a framework for learning, inquiry, and
understanding, than most of the nomological accounts of judicial decision the rationalistjurisprudential tradition has managed to construct.
Th See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
''

See supra note 65.

,78The ideal of permanence "has served as the primary impetus behind the development
of modern science," TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 2, signifying a search for timeless,
universally applicable laws that describe how nature is.
"" See supra note 106.

.80See supra notes 102, 103, 106, 138 and accompanying text.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985

55

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:391

skills that comprise one's discipline, and (b) adherence to traditional intellectual virtues such as patience, courage, and integrity. And where do
we confront deep value issues here?
To be sure, technologism suggests, our students will encounter the full
force of moral ambiguity in decisions they make in the world. But resolution of such ambiguity by academics themselves is not central to the ideals and the processes that constitute the community of academic
intellect.' 8'

'"I Our students are preparing for professional roles in which they will continually confront issues of power, choice, and value. A principal source to which they will look for guidance is the written and unwritten standards of the bar. The fact that "legal ethics" courses
do not receive the attention they deserve, (see, e.g., Gee & Jackson, Current Studies of
Legal Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 471, 503-04 (1982)),
is less significant than the fact that academic intellect is fundamentally uncomfortable with
moral education, addressed in terms other than (a) "Law Day homilies" (see supra note 50),
or (b) raising questions.
Thus, the academic is comfortable asking, can a "good person" be a lawyer? Elkins, Moral
Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 24, 49, 51 (1982). But a
question more relevant for our students is this: "How can I, aspiring to be a good person,
learn to make decisions on questions of power, choice, and value in my professional life?"
The academic tends to dismiss concern for the process of finding answers as betraying a
naive belief that these questions have answers. Cf. id. at 21-22.
Reference earlier was made to Boyer & Cramton, supra note 146, (hereinafter, Agenda).
As also noted, supra note 155, the Agenda was written as a prospectus for a major program
of social science research in legal education, and of reform predicated on such research.
Given the increasing importance of the social science orientation in the law school culture,
and the prominence of the Agenda itself, one must attach significance to the way the
Agenda treats the question of power, choice and value.
In a section on The Emotional Climate of the Law Schools, Agenda at 259-70, the
Agenda turns to "the longstanding debate over the proper role of the law schools in training
students for ethical behavior and professional responsibility." Id. at 267. (Thus treating issues of value as a subcategory of the emotional and subjective, see also id. at 295-96; Kreiling, supra note 107, at 287 n.10 (allocating "values, attitudes and beliefs" to the "affective
or feeling domain")), is a central feature of psychologized self-conception.)
The Agenda follows its introduction of this topic with the passage quoted below. The
passage is set out in full to enable the reader to attend not only to its substance, but also to
its scientific-empiricist epistemology, (see also supra notes 155 (last paragraph) and 156),
which-pervading the Agenda-seems increasingly identified with competence as an
academic.
The psychoanalytic critics are now asserting that ethical behavior is much more
of an emotional than a rational matter: the intellectual exercise of defining the
applicable facts, principles, and competing interests in an ethical problem situation is only a first step, and one that may easily lead to unethical action if it is not
supplemented by a proper emotional response to conflicting loyalties. Moreover,
sociological commentators have expressed doubt that the law schools can effectively 'socialize' their students to behave ethically in later years when they encounter situations in practice where institutional and group forces create pressure
toward unprofessional conduct. Yet, even if one focuses solely on the intellectual
content of professional responsibility, the question arises whether inculcation of
principles officially sanctioned by the organized bar is consistent with the scholarly ideals of academic freedom and free, open, skeptical inquiry.
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This, then, is where the nomological tradition has led-and it is an impossible position. For, choosing and valuing are inseparable; any ethos
that blinds us to the fundamental value issues, in the sense of issues we
resolve, in our academic lives, blinds us also to the value dimensions of
our academic lives.
It is above all for this reason that the post-nomological perspective,
with its emphasis on choice, change, and self-formation, asserts that we
need ideals of intellect more congruent with the value choices that in fact
underlie the academic enterprise. We need, in short, conceptions of intellect, and of theoretic dialogue in the academy, that bring us more in
touch with our identity as moral beings.
Post-nomological conceptions of intellect explored in this Article are
responsive to this quest;" 2 for, the thrust of those conceptions is that
choice permeates our lives as academics. Issues of moral being arise most
compellingly because our choices affect other people. Beyond influencing
the lives of individual students, academics exercise a deeper power in
shaping the theories, and hence the self-conceptions, by which society
lives.183 Theoretic dialogue congruent with such choice and power, then, is
seen to be an essential mechanism of responsible action, by which we
each can account to our students and to the academic community for
what we do, and the academic community can account to society at large.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

At one level, this Article argues that post-nomological thought gives us
important new ways to see projects of science, of law, and of education.
Id. at 267-68 (citations omitted). The Agenda then concludes its consideration of this issue
with the following:
It is a perversion of [a university's] facilities to use them primarily and directly as
an element in a policing scheme, especially when the standards of conduct involved are prescribed very largely by a relatively small group. It seems clear that
rules of legal ethics, no matter how sincerely they are framed, can express the
public interest only as that interest appears to lawyers so long as they are framed
by lawyers.
Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
To be sure, the ideals of scientific empiricism and objectivized intellect have great value.
But, in the present context, where do they lead with respect to moral education Specifically,
what do they say about the proposition that moral action entails working with, applying and
improving as one can, the body of principles one finds in the world of one's work?
At the heart of the matter, and the reason the Article has addressed here law school
instruction in "legal ethics and professional responsibility," is that this issue mirrors our
relation to our own work, and the difficulty we have reconciling with the ideology of academic intellect community issues of power, choice and value presented for resolution by us
in the academic setting. See Simon, supra note 163 at 553-54. See also supra note 164.
ns2 One of the most important of these is the ideal of deliberative intentionality and open
dialogue-since it contributes to the arts of community that are the processuralfoundation
for the inquiry itself. See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
181See TRANSFORMATION, supra note 8, at 97-98, 201, 204-05.
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At a deeper level, however, the Article argues that however and whatever
we academics choose to see, these are choices for which we have a moral
responsibility to account.
Thus, as we leave the nomological ideals of certainty and permanence,
we move to another set of ideals, the ideals of morality, self-creation and
community. These, then, become the epistemological ground for crucial
questions about intellect: How are we to conceive ideals of intellect, and
how are we to make those ideals more fully present in our own and in our
students' lives?
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